Revenue-Enhancing Pre-Investment Activities under Uncertainty

Tord Olsen[a,*], Verena Hagspiel[a]

[a] *Department of Industrial Economics and Technology Management, Norwegian University of Science and Technology, Trondheim, Norway*

Abstract

Models of investment under uncertainty mostly concern the firm's stochastic environment as exogenously given and subject to constant characteristics. We consider a firm that can sequentially invest to alter the growth rate of a project through a revenue-enhancing pre-investment activity prior to entering a new market, both when the change is fixed and when the magnitude of the change can be optimally chosen by the firm. We find that this incentivises the firm to invest early in revenue-enhancing activities, and then wait to invest to enter the market. There is both an option value of waiting that delays investment in revenue-enhancing activities, as well as an accelerating effect from the change in growth rate. The overall effect on the investment thresholds from increased uncertainty is ambiguous. Which effect dominates is dependent on both the cost parameters and the magnitude of the change in the rate of growth. When the firm can optimally choose the amount of the revenue-enhancing activity, we find that the firm invests more in these activities when uncertainty is higher, but the effect of uncertainty can still be ambiguous. When the marginal cost of the activity increases, the firm both delays the investment and undertakes less revenue-enhancement, but the overall amount spent increases. We conclude that increasing the drift through revenue-enhancing pre-investments is very attractive for the firm, and that this affects the firm's optimal investment strategy.

Keywords: Sequential investment, Real Options, Endogenous uncertainty, Optimal control

1. Introduction

In 2014, The Panasonic Corporation entered into a joint-venture with Tesla Motors Inc. on the *Tesla Gigafactory* project. The venture is a strategic alliance and R&D effort between the two firms in order to position Panasonic for higher long-term growth in a novel market. The president of Panasonic, K. Tsuga, has stated that they *"see the rechargeable battery business as the biggest growth driver. So we are aggressively making an upfront and strategic investment here"*[1]. Through the alliance with Tesla, Panasonic has invested to ob-

*Corresponding author.

Email address: tord.olsen@ntnu.no (Tord Olsen)

[1] Teslarati.com, 11.01.2016. The CEO of Panasonic comments on updated forecasts for projects in an earnings briefing to shareholders. https://www.teslarati.com/panasonic-tesla-battery-gigafactory-investment-growth-driver/, accessed 01.06.2018

tain a favorable position for capturing higher profits in the potential future of high-volume production of lithium-ion batteries for electric vehicles (EVs) and household electricity storage. Therewith, Panasonic has taken an upfront and proactive stake in the development of the EV-market, possibly obtaining a larger profit growth in the future than they would have by waiting passively for the market to develop and only supply EV-producers with battery-cells.

Strategic alliances, marketing campaigns, lobbyism, standard-captures, and other pre-launch activities may influence the growth potential of a project. Thus, a firm can effectively be proactive in its existing and potential markets, influencing the expected growth of new projects before they are installed. The idea that a firm can enhance the potential revenue of a project by undertaking some strategic pre-investment actions, models what McGrath (1997) refers to as *amplifying pre-investments*. Such actions could be aimed at affecting the revenue potential of the product, the adoption rate, or the likelihood of imitation or competing products taking shares of the market.

In this paper, we focus on actions that increase the revenue potential through active investments, changing the firm's future environment favourably. We study two different scenarios: one where the revenue-potential is subject to a fixed change after the firm undertakes a pre-amplifying investment, and one where the firm can choose the intensity of this investment optimally, effectively deciding to what degree it should boost the revenue-potential in the market.

This paper contributes to the strategy literature by formally modelling revenue-enhancing pre-investment opportunities, and investigating their effects. Furthermore, we add to the modelling literature by including such dependencies of the stochastic environment on the firm actions. Regarding the second strand of literature, investment problems under uncertainty are widely studied using the real options approach. However, most models consider the underlying process driving the uncertainty as exogenously given. Dixit & Pindyck (1994) present many of the early models, while Trigeorgis (1996) presents models for portfolios comprised of different options on the same real asset, i.e. embedded options. In the strategy literature, real options reasoning has been used in decision-heuristics. Examples are the score-based questionnaire in McGrath & MacMillan (2000) of mapping a project's possibilities and threats, or the mixed decision-tree analysis and scoring of MacMillan et al. (2006). The field of real options analysis was initiated by Myers (1977), who noted that the presence of uncertainty in cash-flows affects corporate expenditure decisions. A common assumption of the uncertainty in real option models is that the underlying price or demand is following an exogenous stochastic process, often a geometric Brownian motion. Thus, the resulting resolution of uncertainty is purely a function of time, and beyond the control of the firm. Work on endogenous uncertainty is limited to problems of learning-type investments. In this strand of work, Pindyck (1993) regards projects with cost uncertainty and time-to-build, where the *technical uncertainty* can only be resolved through actually undertaking the project. Such uncertainty relates to the physical difficulty of completing a project, affecting, for example, the final amount of an input factor. Hence, technical uncertainty represents endogenous resolution of the uncertainty, dependent of the firm's action, where the uncertainty is not only resolved through time, but also through investment. Another approach in the literature to model endogenous actions of the firm is to allow the exogenous stochastic process to be partly unobservable. The firm must then undertake costly learning activities to assess the true state of the market. Kwon & Lippman (2011), for example, consider a firm that undertakes a small-scale pilot project to infer the full project's profitability. The firm observes a noisy profit flow from the pilot and from this updates the belief of the market state in a Bayesian fashion. The firm must then consider the decision to expand the pilot project or exit. Thijssen et al. (2004) consider a similar situation, where the firm at random times receives imperfect signals from the market and uses these signals in updating its beliefs. The trade-off for the firm is therefore between waiting longer to reduce the uncertainty of the market state, and investing immediately to reap potential profits. This approach is further investigated in a model by Harrison & Sunar (2015), where the firm can adopt different learning modes that affect the quality of the obtained market signals, incurring cost at different rates, dependent on the choice of learning mode. The papers presented above represent examples of earlier models and extensions for including endogenous actions of the firm w.r.t. the stochastic environment.

The aforementioned models are all characterized by endogenous revelation of an exogenous uncertainty process. The firm takes an active role in learning about the uncertainty, but has no means of actually affecting its own environment. There is a clear gap in the literature of real options modelling in studying endogenous influence on the stochastic environment, which is already noted by Adner & Levinthal (2004). Adner & Levinthal (2004) argue that firms take steps to affect the attractiveness of possibilities, either by changing the technical agenda of the project or altering the target market. They further argue that the assumption of exogeneity can be seen as a "wait-and-see" approach to the investment problem. This critique is also valid for the endogenous uncertainty resolution approaches mentioned above, as the firm has no means to change the market state or adapt to it should the market belief turn out unfavourable. In a response to Adner & Levinthal (2004), McGrath et al. (2004) argue that the real options heuristics utilized in the strategy literature can give insights into how upside potential can be enhanced by strategic actions or redirecting projects. Nevertheless, the authors concur with Adner & Levinthal (2004) that further work on endogenous uncertainty resolution and influence is important for advancing the real options approach to investment analysis. We translate this to our modelling approach to allowing for the decision-maker to affect the stochastic process the firm is subject to, through undertaking some specified investments.

In this paper, we aim to address the aforementioned shortcomings of dealing with endogeneity in a real options approach. We analyze how the opportunity for a firm to undertake strategic pre-investment actions to alter a project's growth potential affects the investment behaviour and profits of the firm. This represents a shift from seeing the firm as a passive actor, subject to an exogenous market process, to allowing the firm to proactive and effectively shape its own growth potential through strategic investments. The work on real options subject to stochastic processes with changing parameters is generally very limited, and to the best of our knowledge restricted to one exogenously specified fixed change after an investment. Kwon (2010) studies a firm producing an aging product subject to a downward trending demand, with the possibility to innovate once. The uncertainty is modelled as an arithmetic Brownian motion, with a fixed change in drift if the firm innovates. It might be optimal for the firm to cease operations and exit, or to innovate once to boost the profits. The new product would obtain a higher, but still negative, drift rate if undertaken, thus making an eventual exit of the market inevitable. The effect of uncertainty on the optimal strategy of the firm is found to be non-monotonic, which contradicts the standard result of investment under uncertainty, that higher uncertainty delays investment. Matomäki (2013, Article 1) extends Kwon (2010) for more general stochastic processes, as well as including changes to the volatility of the process, and the results regarding the effect of uncertainty are in line with Kwon (2010). Further, Hagspiel et al. (2016b) expands the setting of Kwon (2010) to allow for capacity choice for the new product, while still holding the change in drift rate for the stochastic demand process as exogenously given. Including capacity choice yields a monotonic effect of uncertainty on the optimal investment timing. The firm invests in larger capacity when uncertainty increases, which then gives an incentive to invest later. Another approach taken in the literature is wherein the volatility of the stochastic process is changed after a certain investment. Herein, Alvarez & Stenbacka (2003) consider a setting where the investment changes the volatility of the firm's environment, while keeping the drift unchanged. They find a non-monotonic effect of uncertainty on the investment threshold. However, allowing for change in the volatility of the process necessitates the use of more advanced mathematical tools. This is left for future work for our problem, as we study a sequential investment problem, with embedded options. This is a complication relative to the single-investment case studied in Alvarez & Stenbacka (2003).

In this paper, the market is characterized by an uncertain price. The price follows a geometric Brownian motion, with a change of drift at the time the firm undertakes the revenue-enhancing investment. We introduce two models: (1) where the change in drift is fixed, meaning that the drift rate is boosted to a specified level when the firm invests in the revenue-enhancing activity. (2) where the change is dependent on the amount of the revenue-enhancing activity the firm undertakes, where the intensity of the activity determines the degree to which the drift is boosted. The first model presents an optimal stopping problem subject to a changing stochastic process, while the second model is a joint optimal stopping and impulse problem, where the change in drift is controlled by the firm (Vollert, 2012). The problem concerns the optimal investment strategy of sequential investment under uncertainty, as the firm can invest in the revenue-enhancing activity and in entering the market at two separated points in time. We find that a fixed change in drift incentivises the firm to invest sequentially, i.e. to invest in revenue-enhancing activities initially and then wait and hold the option to actually finish the project. This is in contrast to the similar two-stage sequential model in Dixit & Pindyck (1994) with constant drift, who find that the firm will never invest sequentially when there is no time-to-build. The incentive is increasing with the magnitude of the boost in drift. We show that the effect of uncertainty is not straightforward. Increasing uncertainty can both delay or accelerate the investment in revenue-enhancing activities. In the case where the firm can optimally choose the magnitude of the change in drift, we find that the firm invests more in revenue-enhancement when uncertainty increases. Further, when the marginal cost of this activity increases, the firm undertakes less revenue-enhancement, while the total amount spent on boosting the drift increases. We check the robustness of these results, considering a more general specification of the effect of the revenue-enhancing activity on the drift rate, and both concave and convex cost function for the activity. Extensive numerical analysis confirms the robustness of the results of uncertainty on investment.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. An investment model with a fixed change in the drift of the price process is presented in Section 2. In Section 3, we extend this approach by letting the firm control the change of drift through the size of the investment. In Section 4 we perform a robustness analysis of the impulse function and the cost of the revenue-enhancing activity. Section 5 summarizes the results. Additional derivations are presented in Appendix Appendix A, while Appendix Appendix B presents proofs of all propositions and corollaries.

2. Investment under fixed change in drift

We consider the investment decision of a monopolist firm with an opportunity to enter a novel market. The market is characterized by a stochastic price process, with a fixed change in market growth triggered by the firm's investment in revenue-enhancing activities. The firm is currently not active, but has the option to irreversibly invest in order to enter the market. The uncertainty of the investment opportunity is characterized by a pair of price processes following geometric Brownian motion, as given by Eq. (1).

$$dP_1 = \alpha_1 P_1 dt + \sigma P_1 dz, \tag{1a}$$

$$dP_2 = \alpha_2 P_2 dt + \sigma P_2 dz. \tag{1b}$$

In Eq. (1), dz denotes the increment of a standard Wiener process and σ the volatility, equal for both geometric Brownian motions. α_1 and α_2 are the drift parameters for the first and second process, respectively. The second price process, $P_2(t)$, starts at the moment of a specified investment action of the firm at time τ, with initial value equal to $P_1(\tau)$, i.e. $P_2(0) = P_1(\tau)$. A sample path of the price process is illustrated in Fig. 1. After the change in drift has occurred, $P_1(t)$ is irrelevant. Further, we assume an appropriate discount rate, ρ, for the project and assume that $\alpha_1 \leq \alpha_2 < \rho$. This assumption allows us to disregard the trivial situation where it would never be optimal for the firm to enter the market, as the expected growth is larger than the discount factor and therefore postponing the investment decision would always be optimal. Our model is similar to that presented by Kwon (2010) and Hagspiel et al. (2016b), where a producing firm is subject to a declining market, with the possibility to innovate once and boost the drift. However, in the mentioned works the boost in drift only postpones the inevitable exit of the market. Conversely, our problem is concerned with the decision of entry rather than exit, and not restricted to a declining market. Further, the two-stage sequential investment model of Dixit & Pindyck (1994, Chapter 10) is a special case of the problem studied here, with $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2$ in Eq. (1).

In Section 2.1, we first outline a two-stage sequential investment problem, where the firm completes the project in two discrete steps. This describes a situation where the firm



Figure 1: One sample path of $P_1(t)$ and $P_2(t)$, with $\alpha_1 = 0.01$, $\alpha_2 = 0.02$, $\sigma = 0.01$. Change of processes at $t = 5$.

undertakes some initial investment, e.g. marketing or lobbyism, prior to actually completing the project. After that, the firm decides when to undergo the second investment to enter the market. Under certain assumptions, this model reduces to a single-investment problem, as outlined in Section 2.2, which represents a simplified case where all revenue-enhancing activities must be conducted at the same time as entering the market. We present this simplification as it helps to build intuition for the controlled single-stage investment problem presented in Section 3. In Section 2.3, results for the comparative statics analysis for both models are presented.

2.1. Two-stage investment with fixed change of drift

In a two-stage sequential investment model, the firm may first undertake an initial investment at a fixed cost I_1. The first-stage investment has the effect of increasing the drift from α_1 to α_2 by switching the price process in Eq. (1) from $P_1(t)$ to $P_2(t)$. The firm then obtains the option to invest in the second stage to complete the project at a fixed cost I_2. After the second investment is undertaken, the project is assumed to generate one unit of output per time period, at price $P_2(t)$, in perpetuity. Without loss of generality, we assume zero operating costs. Then the discounted value of a fixed operating cost can be incorporated into the investment cost, I_2. Thus, the per period profit is given by $\pi(P_2(t)) = P_2(t)$. The value of the firm can then be found as the solution to the following optimal stopping problem

$$F(P_1) = \sup_{\tau_1} \; \mathbb{E}^{P_1}\Bigg[- I_1 e^{-\rho\tau_1} + \sup_{\tau_2 \mathbf{1}_{\{\tau_2 > \tau_1\}}} \Bigg\{ + e^{-\rho\tau_2} \times \mathbb{E}^{P_2}\left[\int_{\tau_2}^{\infty} e^{-\rho(t-\tau_2)}\pi(P_2(t-\tau_1))dt\right] - I_2 e^{-\rho\tau_2} \Bigg\} \Bigg]. \tag{2}$$

In Eq. (2), τ_1 denotes the optimal stopping time of undertaking the first-stage investment to improve the drift of the price process. τ_2 denotes the optimal stopping time of the second-stage investment, at which the firm enters the market. Thenceforth, the firm earns the per period profit flow, $\pi(P_2(t))$. Further, the expectation operators denote that the expectations are conditional on the defined starting values, i.e. that $\mathbb{E}^{P_1} \equiv \mathbb{E}[\cdot|P_1(0) = P_1]$ and $\mathbb{E}^{P_2} \equiv \mathbb{E}[\cdot|P_2(0) = P_1(\tau_1)]$. The solution to the optimal stopping problem in Eq. (2) is characterized by the investment thresholds $P_1(\tau_1) = P_1^*$ and $P_2(\tau_2 - \tau_1) = P_2^*$ of the stochastic price process. The starting point for $P_2(t)$ is given by the value of the geometric Brownian motion $P_1(t)$ at the time of the first investment, τ_1, i.e. $P_2(0) = P_1(\tau_1) = P_1^*$. The three regions of the two-stage investment problem are illustrated in Fig. 2. The optimal stopping problem given by Eq. 2 can be split into three elements: the expected discounted value of the completed project at the time of completion, denoted by $V(P_2(t))$; the value of the option to undertake the second-stage investment, denoted by $F_2(P_2(t))$; and the value of the opportunity to invest in the project's first stage, denoted by $F_1(P_1(t))$.



Figure 2: Regions for the two-stage sequential investment.

To find the value of the investment opportunity, $F_1(\cdot)$, we work backwards; first we derive the value of the completed project, $V(\cdot)$, and the option to invest in the second stage, $F_2(\cdot)$. Using conditions of continuity and smoothness of the value functions at their joint threshold, we obtain the second price threshold, $P_2(\tau_2 - \tau_1) = P_2^*$. Next, we find the value function of the first option, $F_1(P_1)$, and can therewith derive the optimal investment threshold of the first-stage investment, $P_1(\tau_1) = P_1^*$. The complete derivations of the value of the project are given in Appendix Appendix A, while the option values, $F_1(\cdot)$ and $F_2(\cdot)$, are derived in Appendix Appendix B.

The expected present value of the cash flows generated by the project, at the time of the second-stage investment, is given by

$$V(P_2) = \mathbb{E}\left[\int_0^{\infty} e^{-\rho t}P_2(t)dt \mid P_2(0) = P_2\right] = \frac{P_2}{\rho - \alpha_2}, \tag{3}$$

where P_2 is the value of the price process at the time of investment. Thus, the completed project becomes more valuable if the drift-rate or the price at the time of investment increases. Proposition 2.1 presents the expression for the value of the option to invest in the second project stage.

Proposition 2.1. *The value of the option to undertake the second-stage investment, $F_2(P_2)$, is given by*

$$F_2(P_2) = \begin{cases} D_2 P_2^{\beta_{12}} & \text{if } P_2 < P_2^*, \\ V(P_2) - I_2 & \text{if } P_2 \geq P_2^*, \end{cases} \tag{4}$$

where

$$\beta_{12} = \frac{1}{2} - \frac{\alpha_2}{\sigma^2} + \sqrt{\left(\frac{\alpha_2}{\sigma^2} - \frac{1}{2}\right)^2 + \frac{2\rho}{\sigma^2}}, \tag{5}$$

and

$$D_2 = \frac{1}{(\rho - \alpha_2)\beta_{12}} \left[\frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{12} - 1}(\rho - \alpha_2) I_2\right]^{1-\beta_{12}}. \tag{6}$$

The optimal threshold for investing in the second project stage is given by

$$P_2^* = \frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{12} - 1}(\rho - \alpha_2) I_2. \tag{7}$$

Proposition 2.1 shows that the value of the second-stage option is dependent on the price, P_2. If the price is lower than the threshold, the value stems from the option to invest in the second project stage at a later time, i.e. the firm is in the continuation region of the second option. If the price is higher than the threshold, the second project stage is undertaken, and the firm obtains the expected discounted value of the project, net investment cost. This represents the stopping region of the second-stage option.

Proposition 2.2 below presents the value of the option to invest in the first project stage. Here we have to distinguish between two cases. If the first investment threshold, P_1^*, is smaller than the second, P_2^*, the firm obtains the second-stage option to invest in the completed project if it exercises the first-stage option. However, if the first investment threshold is the largest, the firm would undertake both stages concurrently, and the firm receives the expected present value of the cash flows from exercising the first-stage option.

Proposition 2.2. *If the first investment threshold is lower than the second, i.e. $P_1^* < P_2^*$, where P_2^* is given in Eq. (7), the value of the firm, $F_1(P_1)$, is equal to*

$$F_1(P_1) = \begin{cases} D_1 P_1^{\beta_{11}} & \text{if } P_1 < P_1^*, \\ D_2 P_1^{\beta_{12}} - I_1 & \text{if } P_1 \geq P_1^*, \end{cases} \tag{8}$$

where β_{12} and D_2 is given by Eq. (5) and Eq. (6), respectively, and

$$\beta_{11} = \frac{1}{2} - \frac{\alpha_1}{\sigma^2} + \sqrt{\left(\frac{\alpha_1}{\sigma^2} - \frac{1}{2}\right)^2 + \frac{2\rho}{\sigma^2}}, \tag{9}$$

$$D_1 = \frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{11}} D_2 \left[\frac{I_1}{(1 - \frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{11}})D_2}\right]^{1-\frac{\beta_{11}}{\beta_{12}}}. \tag{10}$$

The first-stage investment threshold is then given by

$$P_1^* = \left[\frac{I_1}{(1 - \frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{11}})D_2}\right]^{\frac{1}{\beta_{12}}}. \tag{11}$$

If $P_1^* \geq P_2^*$, the value of the firm is given by

$$F_1(P_1) = \begin{cases} D_1 P_1^{\beta_{11}} & \text{if } P_1 < P_1^*, \\ V(P_1) - I_1 - I_2 & \text{if } P_1 \geq P_1^*, \end{cases} \tag{12}$$

where β_{11} and $V(\cdot)$ is given by Eq. (9) and Eq. (3), respectively, and

$$D_1 = \frac{1}{(\rho - \alpha_2)\beta_{11}} \left[\frac{\beta_{11}}{\beta_{11} - 1}(\rho - \alpha_2)(I_1 + I_2)\right]^{1-\beta_{11}}. \tag{13}$$

Then, the first investment threshold is given by

$$P_1^* = \frac{\beta_{11}}{\beta_{11} - 1}(\rho - \alpha_2)(I_1 + I_2). \tag{14}$$

The ordering of the investment threshold in Proposition 2.2 is dependent on all underlying parameters. The following corollary shows that the ordering of the thresholds is unique, which implies that only one of the cases $P_1^* < P_2^*$ and $P_1^* \geq P_2^*$ holds true for the stated expressions in Eq. (11) and Eq. (14), when compared to the expression of the second threshold in Eq. (7).

Corollary 2.3. *In the sequential investment problem in Proposition 3.3, only one of the cases for the ordering of the threshold give an admissible solution. Further, if it holds that*

$$I_1 < \frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{12} - 1} \times \left(\frac{1}{\beta_{12}} - \frac{1}{\beta_{11}}\right) \times I_2, \tag{15}$$

then $P_1^* < P_2^*$.

If the first threshold is the lowest, the firm will invest in the initial project stage as soon as the price process, $P_1(t)$, is larger than P_1^*, increasing the drift of the project. After this it is optimal to wait until the second price process, $P_2(t)$, reaches the second threshold, P_2^*, before investing in the last stage to complete the project. If the other case holds true, the firm will undertake both project stages at the same time as soon as the first price threshold is reached. Note that we assume no time-to-build, and that the investment is instantaneous. Corollary 2.4 show the dependence of the solution to the values of the drift parameters.

Corollary 2.4.

i) If $\alpha_2 > \alpha_1$, then $\beta_{12} < \beta_{11}$, and Eq. (11) and Eq. (10) are well-behaved.

ii) If $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2$, then $\beta_{11} = \beta_{12}$, and $P_1^* > P_2^*$ always holds.

Corollary 2.4 states that the expressions for the value function and the first threshold price are well-behaved for the cases considered in this paper, and take on positive and real values. Further, in the case of constant drift, the model reduces to the sequential investment problem presented by Dixit & Pindyck (1994, Ch. 10.1), albeit without suspension and operational costs. As Dixit & Pindyck (1994) find, under the assumption of no time-to-build, there is never an incentive to invest in two stages when the drift rate before and after revenue-enhancing investment does not change. We show that when the firm has the opportunity to boost the drift, there is an incentive to invest in two separate stages for certain parameter ranges.

2.2. Single-investment problem reduction

Note that if the second-stage investment cost is set to zero, the two-stage sequential investment problem reduces to that of a single-investment opportunity. We present this model simplifaction here as it will serve as a comparison for the single-investment problem with controlled increase in the drift, presented in Section 3.1. Let I denoting the total cost of both revenue-enhancement and market entry. Then, the reduced model can be represented by the following optimal stopping problem

$$F(P_1) = \sup_{\tau} \; \mathbb{E}^{P_1}\left[-Ie^{\rho\tau} + e^{-\rho\tau} \times \mathbb{E}^{P_2}\left[\int_{\tau}^{\infty} e^{-\rho(t-\tau)}\pi(P_2(t-\tau))dt\right]\right]. \tag{16}$$

The solution to the reduced optimal stopping problem in Eq. (16) is also of a threshold-type, characterized by the investment threshold $P_1^*(\tau)$, where τ is the time of the investment. Now the increase in drift and the onset of the profit flow occur at the same time. The solution to this problem is given by Eq. (12)–(14) in Proposition 2.2, with $I_1 = I$ and $I_2 = 0$. The reduction of the problem is evident in Eq. (7) and Eq. (14): if $I_2 = 0$, then $P_2^* = 0$ and P_1^* can never be smaller than P_2^*. This is intuitive. If the second-stage investment has zero cost, the project will be completed as soon as the threshold for the first-stage investment is reached.

2.3. Comparative statics results

In this section, we present the results of a comparative statics analysis for the optimal investment thresholds P_1^* and P_2^*.

Proposition 2.5. *The optimal threshold of the option to invest in the second project stage, P_2^*, is increasing in σ. The first price threshold, P_1^*, is increasing in σ if $P_1^* \geq P_2^*$. If $P_1^* < P_2^*$, then P_1^* is increasing in σ if the following condition holds,*

$$\frac{I_2}{I_1} < \frac{\beta_{11}(\beta_{12}-1)}{\beta_{11}-\beta_{12}} \exp\left[\frac{\beta_{11}}{\beta_{11}-\beta_{12}}\left(\frac{(\frac{1}{2}\sigma^2(2\beta_{12}-1)+\alpha_2)(\beta_{11}-1)}{(\frac{1}{2}\sigma^2(2\beta_{11}-1)+\alpha_1)(\beta_{12}-1)}-1\right)\right]. \tag{17}$$

Otherwise, P_1^* is decreasing in σ.

Proposition 2.5 shows that the standard result in real options theory of the effect of increased uncertainty might not be true for the initial investment, if the condition in Eq. (17) does not hold. When it holds, the firm demands a higher price to invest in both stages when the uncertainty increases, which is the standard result of investment under uncertainty. We refer to this as the real options effect of uncertainty.

If the condition in Eq. (17) does not hold, a higher uncertainty accelerates the investment in the initial project stage. This is contradictory to the standard real options results (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). Due to the complexity of the condition in Eq. (17), the impact of the different problem parameters cannot be determined easily. The condition is a function of the volatility, σ, both directly and via the dependence in β_{11} and β_{12}. We see from numerical studies that when the first investment cost is very small compared to the cost of the second project stage, the effect of increased uncertainty on the first threshold is ambiguous. Further, this ambiguity seems only to be present when the difference in drift is smaller than some level. Fig. 3 presents two different cases: one for a relatively small change in drift, and one for a relatively large boost in drift. Hence, there are two opposing effects of uncertainty on the first threshold. The real options effect yields that higher uncertainty gives a higher value of waiting, and delays investment, while the change in drift incentivises the firm to invest the first project stage to boost the drift. The effect of uncertainty is dependent on which effect dominates.

An explanation for this non-monotonic effect of uncertainty is that the option to invest in the second project stage becomes more valuable with increased uncertainty. This is a standard real options result. Thus, when the first investment is relatively inexpensive, this increased option value of the subsequent investment stage outweighs the increased value of the insurance embedded in the first-stage option. A higher uncertainty makes the insurance arising from the optionality of the first project stage more valuable, which the firm forfeits if it invests. The effects of changing the level of the initial drift on the optimal investment thresholds are presented in Proposition 2.6.

Proposition 2.6. *The optimal threshold to invest in the first project stage, P_1^*, is increasing in initial drift, α_1, while the second threshold, P_2^*, is unaffected by α_1.*

The threshold for investing in the second project stage is independent of the initial drift level. This is intuitive, as the first investment has already been undertaken, and therefore the first price process, $P_1(t)$, is irrelevant at the time of the decision to undertake the second investment. The drift has already been boosted, so the initial level is not relevant for the



Figure 3: Sensitivity of first price threshold, P_1^*, w.r.t. uncertainty, when the first investment cost is small compared to the second, for two levels of the boosted drift. (Parameters: $I_1 = 10$, $I_2 = 1000$, $\rho = 0.1$, $\alpha_1 = 0.01$.)

firm's decision. The first investment threshold is increasing in α_1. If the level of the boosted drift is kept constant, an increase in the initial drift is effectively decreasing the magnitude of the change. Thus, the firm has less incentive to invest in the first project stage, and demands a higher price to undertake the revenue-enhancing activities. Proposition 2.7 presents the effect of changing the level of the boosted drift on the optimal investment thresholds.

Proposition 2.7. *The optimal threshold to invest in the second project stage, P_2^*, is decreasing in the boosted drift, α_2, if the following condition holds:*

$$\sigma > \sqrt{\frac{\rho - \alpha_1 \beta_{12}}{(\beta_{12} - 1)(\beta_{12} - \frac{1}{2})}}. \tag{18}$$

The first investment threshold, P_1^*, is decreasing in α_2 when $P_1^* \geq P_2^*$.

The threshold for investing to enter the market is decreasing in the boosted drift, α_2. The firm invests in the market at the threshold P_2^* if $P_1^* < P_2^*$, while investing at the threshold P_1^* if $P_1^* \geq P_2^*$. Increasing the boosted drift thus incentivises the firm to enter the market earlier, as the expected discounted value of the project increases.

When the threshold for the first project stage is lower than the second, i.e. $P_1^* < P_2^*$, we refrain to numerical results in order to analyze the effect of increasing the boosted drift on P_1^*. Remark 2.8 presents the effect, while a numerical example is presented in Table 1.

Remark 2.8. *The optimal threshold to invest in the first project stage, P_1^*, is decreasing in the boosted drift, α_2, when $P_1^* < P_2^*$.*

Our numerical analysis suggests that the effect of the boosted drift on the first-stage investment threshold when $P_1^* < P_2^*$ is equal to that presented in Proposition 2.7. This is as expected, as increasing the boosted drift increases the expected discounted value of the project, which increases the value of the option to invest in the final stage. When $P_1^* < P_2^*$, investing in the first project stage represents exchanging the option to invest in the initial stage with the option to invest in the second stage. Upon investing, the firm forgoes the option to invest in the first project stage at a later time, but receives option to invest in the last stage at a later time. Thus, when the value of the underlying project increases, the option to complete the project becomes more valuable, which motivates the firm to invest earlier to obtain this second-stage option.

α_2	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.07	0.08	0.09
P_1^*	49.09	43.63	32.20	23.32	16.29	10.73	6.45	3.32	1.21
P_2^*	45.00	43.42	42.00	40.75	39.65	38.70	37.87	37.16	36.54

Table 1: Effect of increasing the boosted drift on the optimal investment thresholds. (Parameter values: $\rho = 0.1$, $\alpha_1 = 0.0$, $I_1 = 50$, $I_2 = 300$.)

3. Investment under controlled change in drift

We now consider a situation where the firm can optimally choose the drift of the second price process by incurring some additional cost at the time of the first-stage investment. The problem constitutes a joint optimal stopping and optimal impulse problem (Vollert, 2012). In this case the firm has both discretion over the stopping times, as well as direct influence over the parameters of the stochastic diffusion process that characterizes the market environment. This represents an extension of the model presented in Section 2.1 to make the firm active in its own potential market, endogenously affecting the stochastic environment.

The drift term of the second price process is now modelled as dependent on the amount K, i.e. $\alpha_2 = \alpha_2(K)$ in Eq. (1). We denote $\alpha_2(K)$ as the *impulse function*, and K the *control*. Note that the impulse function must be specified so that $\alpha_1 \leq \alpha_2 < \rho$ still hold. The control K represents the amount invested by the firm in order to boost the growth of the project by e.g. marketing or lobbyism. We assume that the firm does not obtain any boost in the drift without investing in revenue-enhancing activities and incurring some extra cost, i.e. $\alpha_2(K = 0) = \alpha_1$. Further, we do not allow disinvestment in revenue-enhancement, where $K < 0$ and $\alpha_2 < \alpha_1$. We model the impulse function, $\alpha_2(K)$, by

$$\alpha_2(K) = \rho - \epsilon - \frac{\rho - \epsilon - \alpha_1}{1 + K}, \tag{19}$$

where $\epsilon > 0$ is an offset-value that ensures that the drift rate, $\alpha_2(K)$, can never approach the discount rate, ρ. This parameter is introduced in order to avoid that the expected discounted value of the cash flows from the project can approach infinity. Practically, this implies that there is a maximum obtainable value of α_2 that the firm can approach, but never



Figure 4: The assumed impulse function: the second drift-rate α_2 plotted as a function of K for parameters: $\rho = 0.04,\ \epsilon = 0.03,\ \alpha_1 = 0$.

attain, by investing more in revenue-enhancing activities. An example plot of Eq. (19) is illustrated in Fig. 4. The choice of function for α_2 is adopted to model diminishing marginal effects on the drift from increasing the amount of revenue-enhancing actions, in line with practical reasoning that increasing the intensity of an investment cannot increase the rate of profit indefinitely. In Section 4 we present an alternative impulse function, and perform a robustness check of our results w.r.t. this choice.

As the firm can now optimally decide the intensity of the revenue-enhancing activity, the cost of the first investment stage is given as a function of the control. We model the first investment stage as having both a fixed and variable part, denoted by $I_K(K) = I_1 + \xi K$. Here $I_1 > 0$ is a constant fixed cost, and ξ the constant marginal cost of the activity. The fixed part represents, for example, the minimum required marketing that needs to be done prior to launching a product, for which the firm does not obtain any boost in the market. For the second project stage, similar to Section 2, there is a fixed investment cost $I_2 > 0$.

In order to build intuition, we first consider a controlled single-investment problem in Section 3.1, where the firm undertakes the revenue-enhancing activities at the same time as committing to the project. This simplified problem will serve as a benchmark to understand how control over the change of drift affects threshold prices and values. Section 3.2 expands to the two-stage sequential investment with control over the drift at the time of the first project stage, i.e. the firm undertakes revenue-enhancing activities in the first project stage, but receives a flow of profits only after the second-stage investment. In Section 3.3, we present the comparative static analysis of the models.

3.1. Single-stage investment, controlled change of drift

We now consider a single-investment case, where the firm can choose the control K optimally at the time of investment in order to boost the drift α_2. The problem can be seen



Figure 5: Regions for the single investment problem with controlled boost in drift.

as a joint optimal stopping and control (impulse) problem, where the firm must decide when to invest and enter the market, and choose the amount of revenue-enhancing activities at the time of investment. The problem can then be written as

$$
\begin{aligned}
F(P_1) = \sup_{\tau} \mathbb{E}^{P_1} \Bigg[& - Ie^{-\rho\tau} \\
& + e^{\rho\tau} \times \max_{K \geq 0} \left\{ \mathbb{E}^{P_2} \left[\int_{\tau}^{\infty} e^{-\rho(t-\tau)} \pi(P_2(t-\tau, K)) dt - \xi K \right] \right\} \Bigg],
\end{aligned}
\tag{20}
$$

where the expectation operators are defined as $\mathbb{E}^{P_1} \equiv \mathbb{E}[\cdot | P_1(0) = P_1]$ and $\mathbb{E}^{P_2} \equiv \mathbb{E}[\cdot | P_2(0) = P_1(\tau)]$.

Fig. 5 illustrates the continuation and stopping regions of the investment problem. The problem is similar to the single investment problem presented in Section 2.2, with the difference that the firm can now decide on the optimal amount of the revenue-enhancing investment (the control variable), hereafter denoted by K^*. The solution procedure is as follows: we find the value function for a given K, then maximize the net project value with respect to K, for any given price P_2. Using the equation for the optimal value $K^*(P_2)$, we find the option value $F(P_1)$ and the threshold price P_1^*.

The expected value of the completed project, $V(P_2, K)$, is similar to before (see Eq. (3)), with the difference that the value function now becomes a function of K. Thus, the expected discounted value of the cash-flows generated by the project, at the time of investment, is given by

$$
V(P_2, K) = \frac{1}{\rho - \alpha_2(K)} P_2. \tag{21}
$$

At the time of the investment, the firm chooses the amount of the revenue-enhancing actions through the control K. Upon investment, the firm must pay the full investment cost of revenue-enhancement and market entry, i.e. $I_K(K) = I + \xi K$. Here $I = I_1 + I_2$ represent the fixed cost of both activities, and $\xi > 0$ the marginal cost of the revenue-enhancing activity. Thus, we want to find the value of K that maximizes the value of the firm at the time of investment, given by

$$
V(P_2, K) - I - \xi K = \frac{1}{\rho - \alpha_2(K)} P_2 - I - \xi K. \tag{22}
$$

We find the optimal control $\hat{K}^*$ by the first-order optimality condition, and controlling that the second-order derivative is negative. Solving this maximization problem yields the value of the optimal revenue-enhancement and the resulting drift function, as functions of the price, P_2, presented in Proposition 3.1.

Proposition 3.1. *The optimal value of the control variable and the resulting optimal drift rate, as functions of the price P_2, are given by*

$$K^*(P_2) = \max\{0, \hat{K}^*\} = \max\left\{0, \frac{\xi(\alpha_1 - \rho) + \sqrt{P_2\xi(\rho - \epsilon - \alpha_1)}}{\xi\epsilon}\right\}, \tag{23}$$

$$\alpha_2^*(P_2) = \alpha_2(K^*(P_2)) = \max\left\{0, \frac{(\epsilon - \rho)\sqrt{P_2\xi(\rho - \epsilon - \alpha_1)} + \rho\xi(\rho - \epsilon - \alpha_1)}{\xi(\rho - \epsilon - \alpha_1) - \sqrt{P_2\xi(\rho - \epsilon - \alpha_1)}}\right\}. \tag{24}$$

The optimal control is given as the maximum of zero and $\hat{K}^*$, as we assume that the control is bounded from below at zero. Thus, the resulting drift rate is the maximum of $\alpha_2^*(P_2)$ and α_1, i.e. $\alpha_2(0) = \alpha_1$ in Eq. (24). Corollary 3.2 presents the condition for which the optimal control is positive.

Corollary 3.2. *The optimal control value K^* is greater than zero if*

$$P_2 > \frac{\xi(\rho - \alpha_1)^2}{\rho - \epsilon - \alpha_1}. \tag{25}$$

Thus, the smaller the potential increase in the drift, the higher the price at the time of investment needs to be for the firm to undergo revenue-enhancing activities. We can now use the optimal control and drift as functions of the price, presented in Proposition 3.1, to find the value of the investment opportunity. The value of the firm is then presented in Proposition 3.3.

Proposition 3.3. *The optimal value of the firm, $F(P_1)$, is given by*

$$F(P_1) = \begin{cases} AP_1^{\beta_{11}} & \text{if } P_1 < P_1^*, \\ \frac{P_1}{\rho - \alpha_2^*(P_1)} - I - \xi K^*(P_1) & \text{if } P_1 \geq P_1^*, \end{cases} \tag{26}$$

with $K^*(P_1)$ and $\alpha_2^*(P_1)$ as given in Proposition 3.1. If the condition in Corollary 3.2 holds, so that $K^* > 0$, then

$$\beta_{11} = \frac{1}{2} - \frac{\alpha_1}{\sigma^2} + \sqrt{\left(\frac{\alpha_1}{\sigma^2} - \frac{1}{2}\right)^2 + \frac{2\rho}{\sigma^2}}, \tag{27}$$

$$A = \frac{\left((\epsilon + \alpha_1 - \rho)\xi + \sqrt{P_1^*\xi(\rho - \epsilon - \alpha_1)}\right) P_1^{*1-\beta_{11}}}{\epsilon\beta_{11}\sqrt{P_1^*\xi(\rho - \epsilon - \alpha_1)}}. \tag{28}$$

Furthermore, the optimal investment threshold is given by

$$\begin{aligned} P_1^* = &\frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{2\beta_{11}-1}{\beta_{11}-1}\right)^2 \xi(\rho-\epsilon-\alpha_1) + \frac{\beta_{11}}{\beta_{11}-1}(I\epsilon - \xi(\rho-\alpha_1)) \\ &+ \frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{2\beta_{11}-1}{\beta_{11}-1}\right)\sqrt{\xi(\rho-\epsilon-\alpha_1)\left(\frac{\beta_{11}}{\beta_{11}-1}(I\epsilon - \xi(\rho-\alpha_1) + \xi(\rho-\epsilon-\alpha_1)\right)}, \end{aligned} \tag{29}$$

if the following condition holds,

$$\frac{I}{\xi} \geq \frac{\rho-\alpha_1}{\epsilon}. \tag{30}$$

If $K^* = 0$, then

$$A = \frac{1}{\beta_{11}(\rho-\alpha_1)}(P_1^*)^{1-\beta_{11}}, \tag{31}$$

and the optimal investment threshold is given by

$$P_1^* = \frac{\beta_{11}}{\beta_{11}-1}(\rho-\alpha_2)I. \tag{32}$$

Similar to the model in Section 2, the value of the option to invest is dependent on the current price level, P_1. If the current price is below the investment threshold, the firm holds the option to invest, with a value equal to the first case in Eq. (26). If the currently observed price is above the threshold, it is optimal to invest immediately, paying the investment cost $I(K^*) = I + \xi K^*(P_1)$, and therewith undertaking the amount of revenue-enhancing activities that maximizes the value of the project at the given price, P_1. The condition in Eq. (30) is necessary for the existence of a unique investment threshold[2]. We assume this condition to always hold, as the opposite case would imply an unrealistically high marginal cost of the activity compared to the fixed investment cost. The following corollary presents conditions for the existence of a real-valued threshold.

Corollary 3.4. *In Proposition 3.3, there exists a real-valued investment threshold, P_1^*, if the following condition holds*

$$I\epsilon \geq \xi(\rho-\alpha_1) - \xi(\rho-\epsilon-\alpha_1)\frac{\beta_{11}-1}{\beta_{11}}. \tag{33}$$

3.2. Two-stage investment, controlled change of drift

We now consider the situation where the firm can affect the expected growth of the price process before launching the project. This represents a two-stage sequential investment, where the increase in drift rate occurs after the initial investment. We assume that the firm

[2]Extensive numerical analysis shows that even if this condition does not hold, there is only one unique threshold P_1^* that is admissible w.r.t. the assumption that $P_1^* \geq P_2^*$. We therefore disregard this for the rest of the section.



Figure 6: Regions for the sequential investment problem with controlled boost in drift.

incurs both a fixed and variable cost from the first-stage investment. Thus, we define the first-stage investment cost by $I_K(K) = I_1 + \xi K$. The joint optimal stopping and impulse control problem is then given by Eq. (34) with the corresponding regions illustrated in Fig. 6.

$$\begin{aligned} F(P_1) = \sup_{\tau_1} \mathbb{E}^{P_1}\Bigg[- I_1 e^{-\rho\tau_1} + \max_{K\geq 0} \mathbb{E}^{P_2}\Bigg\{ - \xi K e^{-\rho\tau_1} \\ + \sup_{\tau_2 \mathbf{1}_{\{\tau_2>\tau_1\}}} \Bigg\{ e^{-\rho\tau_2}\Bigg[\int_{\tau_2}^{\infty} e^{-\rho(t-\tau_2)}\pi(P_2(t-\tau_2,K))dt\Bigg] - I_2 e^{-\rho\tau_2}\Bigg\}\Bigg\}\Bigg]. \end{aligned} \tag{34}$$

The solution approach is similar to that in Section 3.1, taking the control variable as given for any time $t > \tau_1$. Hence, the value function after investment is given by Eq. (21). The value of the option to invest in the second project stage is now a function of the control. The value function is given by the following proposition.

Proposition 3.5. *The value of the second-stage option, $F_2(P_2, K)$, is given by*

$$F_2(P_2,K) = \begin{cases} D_2(K) P_2^{\beta_{12}(K)} & \text{if } P_2 < P_2^*(K), \\ \frac{P_2}{\rho-\alpha_2(K)} - I_2 & \text{if } P_2 \geq P_2^*(K), \end{cases} \tag{35}$$

where

$$\beta_{12}(K) = \frac{1}{2} - \frac{\alpha_2(K)}{\sigma^2} + \sqrt{\left(\frac{\alpha_2(K)}{\sigma^2} - \frac{1}{2}\right)^2 + \frac{2\rho}{\sigma^2}}, \tag{36}$$

$$P_2^*(K) = \frac{\beta_{12}(K)}{\beta_{12}(K)-1}(\rho - \alpha_2(K)) I_2, \tag{37}$$

$$D_2(K) = \frac{1}{(\rho-\alpha_2(K))\beta_{12}(K)} P_2^{*1-\beta_{12}(K)}. \tag{38}$$

The option value of the first project stage is, similar to the case presented in Section 2.1, dependent on the ordering of the first and second investment thresholds. The maximization with respect to K is different for the two cases, dependent on whether exercise of the first-stage option represents entering the continuation or the stopping region of the second-stage option. Note that the boosted drift is a function of the investment K (see Eq. (19)). Proposition 3.6 presents the value of the firm and the price thresholds for the two cases.

Proposition 3.6. *If $P_1^* < P_2^*$, the value of the firm, $F_1(P_1)$, is given by*

$$F_1(P_1) = \begin{cases} D_1 P_1^{\beta_{11}} & \text{if } P_1 < P_1^*(K^*) \\ D_2(K^*) P_1^{\beta_{12}(K^*)} - I_1 - \xi K^* & \text{if } P_1 \geq P_1^*(K^*) \end{cases} \tag{39}$$

where

$$\beta_{11} = \frac{1}{2} - \frac{\alpha_1}{\sigma^2} + \sqrt{\left(\frac{\alpha_1}{\sigma^2} - \frac{1}{2}\right)^2 + \frac{2\rho}{\sigma^2}}, \tag{40}$$

$$K^* = K^*(P_1) = \arg\max_{K \geq 0} \left\{ D_2(K) P_1^{\beta_{12}(K)} - I_1 - \xi K \right\}, \tag{41}$$

$$D_1 = \frac{\beta_{12}(K^*)}{\beta_{11}} D_2(K^*) P_1^{*\beta_{12}(K^*) - \beta_{11}}, \tag{42}$$

and P_1^* is implicitly given as the solution to the following equation

$$(\beta_{12}(K^*) - \beta_{11}) D_2(K^*) P_1^{*\beta_{12}(K^*)} + (I_1 + \xi K^*)\beta_{11} = 0. \tag{43}$$

If $P_1^* \geq P_2^*$, the solution is the same as presented in Proposition 3.1 and Proposition 3.3, with $I = I_1 + I_2$.

In Proposition 3.6, the first threshold price must be found implicitly by solving Eq. (43) numerically. Unlike to the sequential investment problem with fixed change in drift, presented in Proposition 2.2, we cannot ex-ante determine the admissible threshold. Therefore, both cases of the threshold ordering must be considered, and the case that is admissible is adopted.

3.3. Comparative statics result

In this section, we present the comparative statics results for the optimal investment strategy when the firm has control over the change in drift. An extensive numerical analysis is conducted to examine how the investment thresholds and optimal drift rate change with the model parameters when analytic results are not obtainable. The effect of σ on the initial investment threshold for a single-stage problem reduction is presented in Proposition 3.7.

Proposition 3.7. *The optimal threshold for the first stage investment, P_1^*, increases in σ, if $P_1^* \geq P_2^*$.*

From Proposition 3.7, we see that the result from the investment problem under fixed change in drift is still valid under controlled change. If the threshold for the initial investment is larger than the second threshold, the investment decision reduces to a single-stage investment, undertaken when the price becomes larger than P_1^*. Increased uncertainty would then delay the investment, consistent with the results from Section 2. The effects of σ on the thresholds for the other cases are presented in Remark 3.8. Numerical results are given in Table 2 and Table 3.

σ	0.05	0.10	0.15	0.20	0.25	0.30	0.35	0.40
P_1^*	18.20	19.95	21.76	23.66	25.66	27.81	30.14	32.67
P_2^*	30.77	32.88	35.99	39.88	44.46	49.69	55.54	62.03
K^*	14.25	15.15	16.01	16.87	17.74	18.64	19.57	20.54
α_2^*	0.0474	0.0475	0.0476	0.0478	0.0479	0.0480	0.0481	0.0481

Table 2: Effect of increasing uncertainty on the optimal investment thresholds, the optimal amount of revenue-enhancing investment, and the resulting boosted drift. (Parameter values: $\rho = 0.1$, $\epsilon = 0.05$, $\alpha_1 = 0.01$, $\xi = 1$, $I_1 = 50$, $I_2 = 300$.)

σ	0.05	0.15	0.25	0.35	0.45	0.55	0.65	0.75	0.85
P_1^*	21.40	19.70	17.60	16.30	15.80	15.90	16.40	17.40	18.70
P_2^*	103.00	122.13	151.71	189.62	235.83	290.62	354.34	427.23	509.49
K^*	784.01	837.28	876.32	916.26	961.11	1010.3	1061.3	1120.5	1182.5
α_2^*	0.0400	0.0400	0.0400	0.0400	0.0400	0.0400	0.0400	0.0400	0.0400

(a) Low variable cost, $\xi = 0.0001$

σ	0.05	0.15	0.25	0.35	0.45	0.55	0.65	0.75	0.85
P_1^*	32.60	32.10	31.00	31.10	32.40	35.00	38.70	43.60	49.90
P_2^*	103.20	122.93	152.84	190.91	237.19	292.01	355.70	428.55	510.76
K^*	9.57	10.50	11.23	12.08	13.04	14.14	15.36	16.71	18.23
α_2^*	0.0372	0.0374	0.0375	0.0377	0.0379	0.0380	0.0382	0.0383	0.0384

(b) Medium variable cost, $\xi = 1$

σ	0.05	0.15	0.25	0.35	0.45	0.55	0.65	0.75	0.85
P_1^*	53.20	58.50	64.20	72.50	84.20	100.10	121.20	148.60	183.50
P_2^*	103.47	123.87	154.05	192.18	238.43	293.16	356.75	429.48	511.58
K^*	3.87	4.46	5.03	5.68	6.43	7.31	8.31	9.45	10.73
α_2^*	0.0338	0.0345	0.0350	0.0355	0.0360	0.0364	0.0368	0.0371	0.0374

(c) High variable cost, $\xi = 10$

Table 3: Effect of increasing uncertainty on the optimal investment thresholds, the optimal amount of revenue-enhancing investment, and the resulting boosted drift, for three different levels of the variable cost parameter, ξ. (Parameter values: $\rho = 0.1$, $\epsilon = 0.06$, $\alpha_1 = 0.01$, $I_1 = 10$, $I_2 = 1000$.)

Remark 3.8. *The optimal threshold for the second stage investment, P_2^*, increases in σ. The effect of σ on the first-stage threshold, P_1^*, is ambiguous if $P_1^* < P_2^*$ and depends on the cost-parameters in relation to the potential increase in drift. The optimal control value, $K^*(P_1^*)$, increases in σ, yielding an increase in the optimal drift rate, $\alpha_2^*(P_1^*)$.*

Table 2 shows that the firm invests at a higher threshold price for the second project stage when the uncertainty is higher. However, the effect of increasing uncertainty on P_1^* when $P_1^* < P_2^*$ is ambiguous, as shown in Table 3. This is similar to the case of fixed change in drift, presented in Section 2.3, where uncertainty has an ambiguous effect on the initial investment threshold, dependent on the problem parameters. However, now there is an additional cost-parameter for the first-stage investment: the marginal cost of the control, ξ. From our numerical analysis, we see that in case where the fixed portion of the cost, I_1, is low, and the potential boost in drift is small, the first threshold can decrease in σ. This is however dependent on the value of ξ, as presented in Table 3. If the variable part of the cost is high, it mitigates the effect of the low fixed cost, such that the threshold is increasing in the uncertainty (see Table 3c). Since the variable cost is high, the first stage investment becomes more costly for the firm for a given level of the control. The firm chooses the optimal amount of revenue-enhancing activities, which results in the total cost of the first project stage to become large enough for the option value of waiting to dominate under increased uncertainty. However, the other way around is not observed, i.e. that very small values of ξ reverse the effect of a high value of I_1. This can be seen as it is optimal for the firm to invest in revenue-enhancing activities, even when ξ is large, to obtain a valuable boost in drift. Thus, the extra cost the firm incurs from boosting the drift, mitigates the low fixed cost I_1, and the value of waiting dominates the effect of uncertainty on the threshold. In the case where ξ is small, the solution approaches the model with a fixed-change in drift in Section 2.1, as seen in Table 3a. For the cases when the first investment threshold decreases, the same reasoning as in Section 2.3 could hold. As the non-monotonic behaviour of the optimal strategy persists under controlled change in drift, more analysis of this ambiguous effect is warranted in future research.

Nonetheless, the amount of investment in revenue-enhancing activities always increases in σ (for all values of the cost parameters), increasing the resulting boosted drift. We also find that the firm generally waits longer to invest in the market when the product market is more uncertain, i.e. P_2^* increases in σ, but on the other hand conducts more revenue-enhancing activities to attain higher growth. Remark 3.9 presents how the cost of the control affect the optimal strategy for the firm.

Remark 3.9. *The investment threshold for the first project stage, P_1^*, increases in ξ. The second threshold, P_2^*, also increases, but at a lower rate than P_1^*. The optimal control K^* and the resulting drift rate α_2^* decreases in ξ.*

Increasing the cost of the revenue-enhancing activities may lead to the threshold of the first project stage becoming larger than the second threshold, as seen in Table 4. The firm has a lower incentive to invest early in boosting the drift when such investments are more expensive, as the firm forgoes the opportunity to invest later. Also, the firm invests less in

ξ	1	10	20	30	40	50	60	70
P_1^*	23.70	35.70	41.54	44.06	46.06	47.72	49.12	50.32
P_2^*	39.88	40.29	40.52	40.73	40.92	41.09	41.25	41.41
K^*	16.89	5.70	3.96	3.05	2.49	2.11	1.82	1.59
α_2^*	0.0478	0.0440	0.0419	0.0401	0.0385	0.0371	0.0358	0.0346

Table 4: Effect of increased variable cost of revenue-enhancement on the optimal investment thresholds, the optimal amount of revenue-enhancing investment, and the resulting boosted drift. (Parameter values: $\rho = 0.1$, $\epsilon = 0.05$, $\alpha_1 = 0.01$, $\sigma = 0.2$, $I_1 = 50$, $I_2 = 300$.)

α_1	0.000	0.005	0.010	0.015	0.020	0.025	0.030	0.035	0.040
P_1^*	21.65	22.54	23.66	25.07	26.91	29.41	32.95	38.42	41.58
P_2^*	39.93	39.91	39.88	39.86	39.83	39.81	39.78	39.75	39.73
K^*	17.75	17.32	16.87	16.40	15.89	15.32	14.67	13.86	11.70
α_2^*	0.0473	0.0475	0.0478	0.0480	0.0482	0.0485	0.0487	0.0490	0.0492

Table 5: Effect of increased initial drift rate on the optimal investment thresholds, the optimal amount of revenue-enhancing investment, and the resulting boosted drift. (Parameter values: $\rho = 0.1$, $\epsilon = 0.05$, $\sigma = 0.2$, $\xi = 1$, $I_1 = 50$, $I_2 = 300$.)

revenue-enhancing activities, obtaining a lower drift for the project. However, the overall amount paid in revenue-enhancing activities is greater. The firm is willing to pay more overall to obtain the boosted drift, even when it is more expensive per unit of change, as can be seen from multiplying ξ and K^* in Table 4. Since an increased marginal cost of the activity leads to a delay in investment, the firm also to pays more overall in revenue-enhancing activities at this time. Remark 3.10 presents the effect of changing the initial drift, α_1, while numerical results are given in Table 5.

Remark 3.10. *The investment threshold for the first project stage, P_1^*, increases in α_1, while the second threshold, P_2^*, decreases (albeit at a low rate). The optimal control, K^*, decreases in α_1, while the resulting drift rate, α_2^*, increases in α_1.*

The level of the initial drift, α_1, must be seen in relation to the maximum obtainable drift, given as $\rho - \epsilon$, which is assumed constant when changing α_1. Increasing α_1 thus makes the region of $\alpha_2(K)$ smaller, as $\alpha_2(0) = \alpha_1$ and $\alpha_2(\infty) = \rho - \epsilon$, and we assume $K \geq 0$. Remark 3.10 notes that the first threshold increases, while the second threshold decreases slightly. When the initial drift is greater, the firm demands a higher price before investing. When the difference in drift, $\rho - \epsilon - \alpha_1$, is small enough, we see that the ordering of the thresholds changes, and the incentive to invest in two stages diminishes. The firm undertakes less revenue-enhancing activities when the initial drift increases, but the resulting boosted drift rate, $\alpha_2(K)$, increases. However, the change in drift decreases when α_1 increases, as seen in Table 5 by $\alpha_2^* - \alpha_1$.

Since only the lower bound of the range of $\alpha_2(K)$ increases with higher α_1, the firm can obtain the same boosted drift with less effort. This observation can be explained by the example plot in Figure 7. As the initial drift, α_1, is increased, the firm can obtain the



Figure 7: The effect of increasing α_1 on $\alpha_2(K)$. (Parameters: $\rho = 0.04,\ \epsilon = 0.03$.)

ϵ	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.07	0.08
P_1^*	2.80	6.16	10.66	16.42	23.66	32.82	43.16	48.37
P_2^*	36.66	37.32	38.07	38.92	39.88	40.97	42.21	43.59
K^*	37.44	27.13	22.41	19.30	16.87	14.68	11.99	7.57
α_2^*	0.0879	0.0775	0.0674	0.0575	0.0478	0.0381	0.0285	0.0188

Table 6: Effect of decreasing the maximum obtainable drift on the optimal investment thresholds, the optimal amount of revenue-enhancing investment, and the resulting boosted drift. (Parameter values: $\rho = 0.1$, $\alpha_1 = 0.01$, $\sigma = 0.2$, $\xi = 1$, $I_1 = 50$, $I_2 = 300$.)

same boosted drift, $\alpha_2(K)$, at a lower value of the control, K. This effect is evident from comparing K_1 and K_2 in Figure 7. Thus, the firm can obtain a higher boosted drift from an increase in the initial drift, even though the firm undertakes less revenue-enhancing activities. This effect arises since increasing α_1 represents making the initial market conditions more favourable, while keeping the maximum obtainable drift for the firm constant. The effect of increasing ϵ on the optimal investment strategy of the firm is presented in Remark 3.11, with numerical results given in Table 6.

Remark 3.11. *The first-stage investment threshold P_1^* increases in ϵ. The second threshold P_2^* also increases, but at a lower rate than P_1^*. The optimal control K^* and the resulting drift rate α_2^* decrease in ϵ.*

Increasing ϵ is effectively lowering the upper bound of $\alpha_2(K)$, i.e. the maximum obtainable drift rate, as the upper bound is defined as $\rho - \epsilon$. We see from Table 6 that the firm invests at a higher threshold price when the upper bound is lowered, and that the ordering of the thresholds depends on the range of obtainable drift, similar to increasing the initial drift, α_1. The resulting boosted drift rate is now lowered. Thus, when the maximum obtainable drift is lowered, the firm invests later and undertakes less revenue-enhancing activities. Since an increase in ϵ makes the available magnitude of the boost lower, there is less incentive for the firm to invest in the revenue-enhancing activity, which increases the first investment threshold. Further, the smaller obtainable boost makes the expected present value of the project's cash flow after revenue-enhancement lower, which decreases the attractiveness of the project, and increases the second investment threshold.

4. Robustness testing

In this section, we perform a robustness test of the results of the combined optimal stopping and impulse problem presented in Section 3.3. We derive the results assuming an alternate specification of the impulse function in Section 4.1, and introduce a non-linear cost function for the control in Section 4.2. We perform a comparative static analysis of uncertainty for both cases, and compare to the earlier findings presented in Section 3.3.

4.1. Impulse function

We now introduce a more flexible specification of the impulse function. Nonetheless, the basic assumptions made in Section 3 are upheld. I.e. we assume diminishing marginal returns of the value-enhancing activity and assuring that the resulting drift rate is lower than the discount rate. We utilize an inverse exponential function as given by Eq. (44), with example plots of the impulse function given in Fig. 8. Varying λ changes the slope of the impulse, yielding a more refined specification of how the value-enhancing investment affects the drift rate of the stochastic process. However, the downside is that under this impulse function there exists no closed form solutions for the optimal control value and investment thresholds, in any of the cases. These values can easily be computed numerically.

$$\alpha_2(K) = \rho - \epsilon - (\rho - \epsilon - \alpha_1)e^{-\lambda K} \tag{44}$$

The optimal stopping problem is the same as presented in Eq. (34). The value of the options to invest in the first and second stage is equal to that given by Eq. (35)-(43). However, if $P_1^* \geq P_2^*$, there is no closed-form solution available, and the value of the option to invest is given by the following proposition.

Proposition 4.1. *If $P_1^* \geq P_2^*$, the value of the investment opportunity is given by*

$$F(P_1) = \begin{cases} D_1 P_1^{\beta_{11}} & \text{if } P_1 < P_1^*, \\ \frac{P_1}{\rho - \alpha_2(K^*)} - I_1 - I_2 - \xi K^*(P_1) & \text{if } P_1 \geq P_1^*, \end{cases} \tag{45}$$

where

$$\beta_{11} = \frac{1}{2} - \frac{\alpha_1}{\sigma^2} + \sqrt{\left(\frac{\alpha_1}{\sigma^2} - \frac{1}{2}\right)^2 + \frac{2\rho}{\sigma^2}}, \tag{46}$$

$$K^* = K^*(P_1) = \arg\max_{K \geq 0} \left\{ \frac{P_1}{\rho - \alpha_2(K)} - I_1 - I_2 - \xi K^*(P_1) \right\}, \tag{47}$$

$$D_1 = \frac{(P_1^*)^{1-\beta_{11}}}{(\rho - \alpha_2(K^*))\beta_{11}}, \tag{48}$$



Figure 8: Inverse exponential impulse function as given by Eq. (44). The second drift-rate is plotted as a function of the control. (Parameters: $\rho = 0.04,\ \epsilon = 0.03,\ \alpha_1 = 0$).

and P_1^* is implicitly given as the solution to the following equation

$$(\beta_{11} - 1)\frac{P_1^*}{\rho - \alpha_2(K^*(P_1^*))} - \beta_{11}(I_1 + I_2 + \xi K^*(P_1^*)) = 0. \tag{49}$$

Conducting a numerical comparative statics analysis of the investment thresholds, we compare the results to those obtained in Section 3.3. The effect of volatility on the optimal investment thresholds, optimal control value, and resulting drift rate, under the new impulse function are given in Table 7. We see in Table 7a and Table 7b that under a steep impulse function, which resembles the specification in Section 3.3, the initial investment threshold can be both increasing and decreasing in volatility. Similar to before, when the cost of the initial investment is significantly lower than that of the second investment, we observe a non-monotonic effect of uncertainty on the initial investment threshold. In Table 7c and Table 7d, the impulse function is less steep, with $\lambda = 0.1$. The effect of uncertainty can also be non-monotonic here, but this necessitates the marginal cost of the impulse, ξ, to be low. Thus, there is an interplay between the effect of the value-enhancing activity on the drift rate, and the marginal cost of the activity, in whether there is a non-monotonic effect of uncertainty. This is in line with Table 3 in Section 3.3, wherein a high marginal cost of the control makes the effect of uncertainty monotonic. Thus, we can confirm that our earlier results are robust to the specification of the impulse function, providing that the underlying assumptions of the firm's effect on the drift rate is upheld.

4.2. Non-linear cost of impulse

We now investigate the role of the specification of the cost for the value-enhancing activity. We introduce a more general, non-linear, investment cost function for the impulse, so that the cost structure can be either convex or concave, depending on parameter values. This

σ	0.05	0.10	0.15	0.20	0.25	0.30	0.35	0.40
P_1^*	15.50	16.83	18.16	19.49	20.88	22.34	23.84	25.50
P_2^*	30.74	32.77	35.82	39.67	44.21	49.41	55.25	61.73
K^*	5.34	5.45	5.54	5.62	5.71	5.79	5.86	5.94
α_2^*	0.0498	0.0498	0.0498	0.0499	0.0499	0.0499	0.0499	0.0499

(a) $\xi = 1$, $I_1 = 50$, $I_2 = 300$, $\lambda = 1$.

σ	0.05	0.15	0.25	0.35	0.45	0.55	0.65	0.75
P_1^*	14.34	14.11	13.25	12.79	12.81	13.25	14.05	15.19
P_2^*	102.46	119.45	147.44	184.24	229.62	283.78	346.99	419.47
K^*	4.57	4.72	4.82	4.93	5.03	5.14	5.26	5.38
α_2^*	0.0496	0.0496	0.0497	0.0497	0.0497	0.0498	0.0498	0.0498

(b) $\xi = 1$, $I_1 = 10$, $I_2 = 1000$, $\lambda = 1$.

σ	0.05	0.10	0.15	0.20	0.25	0.30	0.35	0.40
P_1^*	19.88	21.93	24.15	26.50	28.98	31.62	34.49	37.56
P_2^*	30.75	32.82	35.90	39.76	44.31	49.51	55.35	61.83
K^*	33.20	34.37	35.47	36.51	37.51	38.47	39.42	40.36
α_2^*	0.0486	0.0487	0.0488	0.0490	0.0491	0.0491	0.0492	0.0493

(c) $\xi = 1$, $I_1 = 50$, $I_2 = 300$, $\lambda = 0.1$.

σ	0.05	0.15	0.25	0.35	0.45	0.55	0.65	0.75
P_1^*	11.96	11.51	10.52	9.90	9.70	9.86	10.30	10.98
P_2^*	102.44	119.37	147.33	184.11	229.48	283.64	346.86	419.35
K^*	66.03	67.48	68.41	69.34	70.30	71.32	72.38	73.46
α_2^*	0.0499	0.0500	0.0500	0.0500	0.0500	0.0500	0.0500	0.0500

(d) $\xi = 0.01$, $I_1 = 10$, $I_2 = 1000$, $\lambda = 0.1$.

Table 7: Effect of increasing uncertainty on the optimal investment thresholds, the optimal amount of revenue-enhancing investment, and the resulting boosted drift under an inverse exponential impulse function as given by Eq. (44). (General parameters: $\rho = 0.1$, $\epsilon = 0.05$, $\alpha_1 = 0.01$.)

is similar to the studies performed in capacity choice models under uncertainty, like Dangl (1999) and Hagspiel et al. (2016a). A concave cost function indicates a decreasing marginal cost of investment, in line with a situation of economies of scale for the investment, while a convex cost function represent diseconomies of scale. Here we assume that the impulse function is given as in Eq. (19), to investigate the case of changed investment cost compared to the base case controlled model with linear cost. The cost of the value-enhancing activity undertaken at the first investment stage is a function of the control K, and defined as

$$I_K(K) = I_1 + \xi K^{\eta}, \tag{50}$$

where the constant I_1, ξ, and η are larger than zero. $\eta = 1$ represents the case of linear cost studied in Section 3.1 and Section 3.2, while $\eta \in (0, 1)$ represents a concave and $\eta > 1$ a convex cost function. The value of the second-stage option is given by Eq. (35)-(38). Similar to before, there are two cases for the first-stage investment option which must be considered. The value of the first investment option is given in the following proposition.

Proposition 4.2. *If the first threshold is lower than the second, i.e. $P_1^* < P_2^*$, the value of the first investment option is given by*

$$F_1(P_1) = \begin{cases} D_1 P_1^{\beta_{11}} & \text{if } P_1 < P_1^*(K^*), \\ D_2(K^*) P_1^{\beta_{12}(K^*)} - I_1 - \xi (K^*)^{\eta}, & \text{if } P_1 \geq P_1^*(K^*), \end{cases} \tag{51}$$

where β_{11} is given by Eq. (9), D_1 by Eq. (42), and $D_2(K)$ by Eq. (38). The optimal control is given by the maximization

$$K^* = K^*(P_1) = \underset{K \geq 0}{\arg\max} \left\{ D_2(K) P_1^{\beta_{12}(K)} - I_1 - \xi K^{\eta} \right\}, \tag{52}$$

and P_1^* is implicitly given as the solution to the following equation

$$(\beta_{12}(K^*) - \beta_{11}) D_2(K^*) P_1^{*\beta_{12}(K^*)} + \beta_{11}(I_1 + \xi (K^*)^{\eta}) = 0. \tag{53}$$

If $P_1^* \geq P_2^*$, the value of the first investment option is given by

$$F(P_1) = \begin{cases} D_1 P_1^{\beta_{11}} & \text{if } P_1 < P_1^*, \\ \frac{P_1}{\rho - \alpha_2(K^*)} - I_1 - I_2 - \xi (K^*(P_1))^{\eta} & \text{if } P_1 \geq P_1^*, \end{cases} \tag{54}$$

with D_1 given by Eq. (48) and the optimal control as the maximization

$$K^* = K^*(P_1) = \underset{K \geq 0}{\arg\max} \left\{ \frac{P_1}{\rho - \alpha_2(K)} - I_1 - I_2 - \xi K^*(P_1) \right\}. \tag{55}$$

The first investment threshold, P_1^*, is implicitly given as the solution to the equation given *by*

$$(\beta_{11}-1)\frac{P_1^*}{\rho-\alpha_2(K^*(P_1^*))}-\beta_{11}(I_1+I_2+\xi(K^*(P_1^*))^{\eta})=0. \tag{56}$$

Conducting a numerical comparative static analysis of the effect of uncertainty, the results under both concave and convex cost functions are given in Table 8. In Table 8a and Table 8b, we see that the earlier result of non-monotonicity w.r.t. uncertainty hold under a concave cost structure for the control. A relatively low initial investment cost may yield a non-monotonic effect of uncertainty on the investment cost. In Table 8c and Table 8d we see the same holds for a convex cost function. Thus, our previous results are robust under various specifications of the cost function. In a capacity choice model, Hagspiel et al. (2016a) investigate the case of both a concave and convex investment cost, and find that the firm invests significantly later under a convex than a concave cost function. Comparing the concave and convex cases in Table 8, we see that in our impulse problem, a convex investment cost also delays the initial investment decision relative to the concave case. The firm also invest in less value-enhancement when there are diseconomies of scale, as would be expected.

5. Conclusions

In this paper, we study the investment problem of a firm with an option to irreversibly invest to enter a novel market. The firm has the opportunity to undertake some amplifying pre-investments to boost the expected value of the profits from the project, e.g. through marketing or lobbyism. The stochastic market price is modelled as a geometric Brownian motion, subject to a change in drift following from the revenue-enhancing pre-investment. We consider a case with a fixed change in drift, and a situation where the magnitude of the change is influenced by the amount of revenue-enhancing activities undertaken by the firm. This makes the stochastic environment of the firm endogenous, as the firm can influence its potential profits through its actions.

We find that when a firm can change the drift rate of the cash flows from a project, it has an incentive to invest sequentially, and to boost the drift before committing to launching the project. This result is not dependent on including other complicating factors such as time-to-build, contrarily to what is shown by Dixit & Pindyck (1994), but is a pure effect of the change in the stochastic environment. The effect of uncertainty on the investment triggers is ambiguous. For the revenue-enhancing investment, increasing the uncertainty can both delay or accelerate the investment w.r.t. the threshold price, depending on the parameter values. The effect of the option value of waiting and the incentive to invest early to boost the drift are conflicting. Which effect dominates is dependent on the cost parameters, the magnitude of the change in drift, as well as the level of the uncertainty.

In the situation where the firm can optimally choose the magnitude of the boost in drift through the intensity of revenue-enhancing activities, we find that higher uncertainty leads to more investment. The firm invests more to boost the drift when the market is characterized by a higher volatility. Increasing the marginal cost of the revenue-enhancing activities decreases the intensity of the activity, but increases the total amount spent on

σ	0.05	0.10	0.15	0.20	0.25	0.30	0.35	0.40
P_1^*	14.96	16.18	17.31	18.43	19.58	20.78	22.11	23.53
P_2^*	30.74	32.80	35.86	39.72	44.27	49.48	55.32	61.81
K^*	60.18	64.52	68.36	72.13	76.00	79.98	84.22	88.62
α_2^*	0.0492	0.0492	0.0493	0.0493	0.0494	0.0494	0.0494	0.0494

(a) Concave cost function: $\xi = 1$, $I_1 = 50$, $I_2 = 300$, $\eta = 0.5$.

σ	0.05	0.15	0.25	0.35	0.45	0.55	0.65	0.75
P_1^*	14.70	14.26	13.22	12.62	12.56	12.97	13.77	14.91
P_2^*	102.50	119.67	147.79	184.66	230.08	284.26	347.46	419.94
K^*	36.25	40.20	42.93	45.94	49.42	53.46	58.00	63.10
α_2^*	0.0487	0.0488	0.0489	0.0489	0.0490	0.0491	0.0492	0.0492

(b) Concave cost function: $\xi = 1$, $I_1 = 10$, $I_2 = 1000$, $\eta = 0.5$.

σ	0.05	0.10	0.15	0.20	0.25	0.30	0.35	0.40
P_1^*	19.43	21.24	23.06	25.01	27.07	29.31	31.74	34.49
P_2^*	30.83	33.04	36.25	40.22	44.86	50.12	56.01	62.52
K^*	7.23	7.61	7.95	8.31	8.67	9.04	9.42	9.83
α_2^*	0.0439	0.0442	0.0444	0.0446	0.0448	0.0450	0.0452	0.0454

(c) Convex cost function: $\xi = 1$, $I_1 = 50$, $I_2 = 300$, $\eta = 1.5$.

σ	0.05	0.15	0.25	0.35	0.45	0.55	0.65	0.75
P_1^*	24.71	24.51	23.72	23.86	25.20	27.65	31.41	36.62
P_2^*	102.82	121.17	150.08	187.40	233.05	287.32	350.52	422.91
K^*	5.87	6.38	6.77	7.23	7.77	8.39	9.12	9.95
α_2^*	0.0427	0.0432	0.0436	0.0439	0.0443	0.0447	0.0451	0.0454

(d) Convex cost function: $\xi = 1$, $I_1 = 10$, $I_2 = 1000$, $\eta = 1.5$.

Table 8: Effect of increasing uncertainty on the optimal investment thresholds, the optimal amount of revenue-enhancing investment, and the resulting boosted drift under a generalized investment cost function as given by Eq. (50). (General parameters: $\rho = 0.1$, $\epsilon = 0.05$, $\alpha_1 = 0.0$.)

boosting the drift. As a higher marginal cost delays the investment, the firm optimally incurs a larger total cost of this activity, even though the resulting effect on the drift is smaller.

This paper represents an early effort in including endogeneity in real options modelling, bridging the gap to the use of option reasoning in the decision-heuristic oriented strategy literature. The functional form of how the firm can affect the drift of the market, and the structure of the cost of this influence, is generally motivated, but not made to fit any specific practical actions. However, we see that the results are robust w.r.t. these specifications, suggesting that the results hold more generally for activities of this kind that a firm can undertake. Future research could investigate specific activities that a firm can undertake, basing the specification of the influence on literature on the type of activities considered, like marketing or standard-captures. This could also allow for empirical testing for the results. Further, considering changes in volatility could broaden the connection to practical investment problems, as the degree of risk-taking may be an important decision for a firm introducing a new product, like the case motivated in Alvarez & Stenbacka (2003). Lastly, future studies could compare the value added from the opportunity to boost the drift, to the case where the firm has no such affect on the market. This could give further insight into the nature of including such dependencies of the market characteristics on decisions of the firm.

References

Adner, R., & Levinthal, D. A. (2004). What is not a real option: Considering boundaries for the application of real options to business strategy. *Academy of management review*, *29*, 74–85.

Alvarez, L. H., & Stenbacka, R. (2003). Optimal risk adoption: a real options approach. *Economic Theory*, *23*, 123–147.

Dangl, T. (1999). Investment and capacity choice under uncertain demand. *European Journal of Operational Research*, *117*, 415–428.

Dixit, A. K., & Pindyck, R. S. (1994). *Investment under uncertainty*. Princeton university press.

Hagspiel, V., Huisman, K. J., & Kort, P. M. (2016a). Volume flexibility and capacity investment under demand uncertainty. *International Journal of Production Economics*, *178*, 95–108.

Hagspiel, V., Huisman, K. J., Kort, P. M., & Nunes, C. (2016b). How to escape a declining market: Capacity investment or exit? *European Journal of Operational Research*, *254*, 40–50.

Harrison, J. M., & Sunar, N. (2015). Investment timing with incomplete information and multiple means of learning. *Operations Research*, *63*, 442–457.

Kwon, H. D. (2010). Invest or exit? Optimal decisions in the face of a declining profit stream. *Operations Research*, *58*, 638–649.

Kwon, H. D., & Lippman, S. A. (2011). Acquisition of project-specific assets with bayesian updating. *Operations Research*, *59*, 1119–1130.

MacMillan, I. C., Van Putten, A. B., McGrath, R. G., & Thompson, J. D. (2006). Using real options discipline for highly uncertain technology investments. *Research-Technology Management*, *49*, 29–37.

Matomäki, P. (2013). *On two-sided controls of a linear diffusion*. Ph.D. thesis Turku School of Economics.

McGrath, R. G. (1997). A real options logic for initiating technology positioning investments. *Academy of Management Review*, *22*, 974–996.

McGrath, R. G., Ferrier, W. J., & Mendelow, A. L. (2004). Real options as engines of choice and heterogeneity. *Academy of Management Review*, *29*, 86–101.

McGrath, R. G., & MacMillan, I. C. (2000). Assessing technology projects using real options reasoning. *Research-Technology Management*, *43*, 35–49.

Myers, S. C. (1977). Determinants of corporate borrowing. *Journal of financial economics*, *5*, 147–175.
Pindyck, R. S. (1993). Investments of uncertain cost. *Journal of financial Economics*, *34*, 53–76.
Thijssen, J. J., Huisman, K. J., & Kort, P. M. (2004). The effect of information streams on capital budgeting decisions. *European Journal of Operational Research*, *157*, 759–774.
Trigeorgis, L. (1996). *Real options: Managerial flexibility and strategy in resource allocation*. MIT press.
Vollert, A. (2012). *A stochastic control framework for real options in strategic evaluation*. Springer Science & Business Media.

Appendix A. Additional derivations

This section presents derivations of the value of the expected discounted cash flows of the project.

Appendix A.1. The value of the project

Assume that the profit flow per unit time period after the project is launched is given as $\pi(P_2, t) = P_2(t)$, where $P_2(t)$ follows Eq. (1b), and that the appropriate discount rate for the project is ρ. Then the value of the project $V(P_2)$ for a price P_2 at investment is found using a dynamic programming approach (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). The per time period value of the installed project should be given by the profit flow, plus the change in project value (capital gains), so we have

$$\begin{aligned} \rho V(P_2)dt &= \pi(P_2)dt + \mathbb{E}[dV(P_2)] \\ &= \pi(P_2)dt + \left[\alpha_2 P_2 \frac{\partial V(P_2)}{\partial P_2} + \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2 P_2^2 \frac{\partial^2 V(P_2)}{\partial P_2^2}\right] dt \end{aligned} \tag{A.1}$$

Thus, the value of the completed project, $V(P_2)$, must satisfy the differential equation

$$\alpha_2 P_2 \frac{\partial V(P_2)}{\partial P_2} + \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2 P_2^2 \frac{\partial^2 V(P_2)}{\partial P_2^2} - \rho V(P_2) + \pi(P_2) = 0. \tag{A.2}$$

The last term leads to a particular solution, since $\pi(P_2) = P_2$. The value function $V(P_2)$ is given by the combination of a homogeneous and particular solution, and equal to

$$V(P_2) = B_1 P_2^{\beta_{12}} + B_2 P_2^{\beta_{22}} + \frac{P_2}{\rho - \alpha_2}. \tag{A.3}$$

In Eq. (A.3), β_{12} and β_{22} are the positive and negative solutions, respectively, of the fundamental quadratic

$$\mathcal{Q} \equiv \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2 \beta_2(\beta_2 - 1) + \alpha_2\beta_2 - \rho = 0, \tag{A.4}$$

giving $\beta_{12} > 1$ and $\beta_{22} < 0$ (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). The boundary condition $\lim_{P_2 \to 0} V(P_2) = 0$, gives that $B_2 = 0$ must hold, since $\beta_{22} < 0$. Further, assuming no speculative bubbles as in Dixit & Pindyck (1994), we have $B_1 = 0$ as well, and the project value is given its the fundamental value only:

$$V(P_2) = \frac{P_2}{\rho - \alpha_2}. \tag{A.5}$$

Appendix B. Proofs

This section presents proofs of all propositions and corollaries.

Appendix B.1. Proof of Proposition 2.1

The discounted change in value of the option to undertake the second-stage investment, $F_2(P_2)$, for a given value P_2 of the price process is equal to the capital gains of the option, as there is no profit flow from holding the option. The value function must satisfy the Bellman equation

$$\rho F_2(P_2)dt = \mathbb{E}[dF_2(P_2)] = \left[\alpha_2 P_2 \frac{\partial F_2(P_2)}{\partial P_2} + \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2 P^2 \frac{\partial^2 F_2(P_2)}{\partial P_2^2}\right] dt, \tag{B.1}$$

where the right-hand-side follows from Itô's Lemma. This gives the differential equation

$$\alpha_2 P_2 \frac{\partial F_2(P_2)}{\partial P_2} + \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2 P_2^2 \frac{\partial^2 F_2(P_2)}{\partial P_2^2} - \rho F_2(P_2) = 0. \tag{B.2}$$

From the boundary condition $F(0) = 0$, we obtain the solution form $F_2(P_2) = D_2 P_2^{\beta_{12}}$, where β_{12} is the positive root of the characteristic quadratic equation

$$\frac{1}{2}\sigma^2 \beta_2(\beta_2 - 1) + \alpha_2\beta_2 - \rho = 0. \tag{B.3}$$

The remaining boundary conditions for the value function are

$$\begin{aligned} F_2(P_2^*) &= V(P_2^*) - I_2, \\ F_2'(P_2^*) &= V'(P_2^*). \end{aligned} \tag{B.4}$$

Eq. (B.4) represent the value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions at the optimal threshold price for investing in the second project stage, with the value of the completed project $V(P_2)$ given by Eq. (A.5). At the investment threshold, the value of the option and the completed project must be continuous and smooth (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994). From these conditions the threshold price, P_2^*, and the constant, D_2, are given by

$$P_2^* = \frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{12} - 1}(\rho - \alpha_2)I_2, \tag{B.5}$$

$$D_2 = \frac{1}{(\rho - \alpha_2)\beta_{12}}\left[\frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{12} - 1}(\rho - \alpha_2)I_2\right]^{1-\beta_{12}}. \tag{B.6}$$

Hence, the value of the option to invest in the second-stage is given by

$$F_2(P_2) = \begin{cases} D_2 P_2^{\beta_{12}} & \text{if } P_2 < P_2^*, \\ V(P_2) - I_2 & \text{if } P_2 \geq P_2^*, \end{cases} \tag{B.7}$$

where $V(P_2)$ is given in Eq. (A.5). □

Appendix B.2. Proof of Proposition 2.2

The value of the option to invest in the first stage, $F_1(P_1)$, and thus the value of the firm, for a given price P_1, is given by the Bellman equation and Itô's Lemma as

$$\rho F_1(P_1)dt = \mathbb{E}[dF_1(P_1)] = \left[\alpha_1 P_1 \frac{\partial F_1(P_1)}{\partial P_1} + \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2 P_1^2 \frac{\partial^2 F_1(P_1)}{\partial P_1^2}\right] dt, \tag{B.8}$$

which gives the differential equation

$$\alpha_1 P_1 \frac{\partial F_1(P_1)}{\partial P_1} + \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2 P_1 \frac{\partial^2 F_1(P_1)}{\partial P_1^2} - \rho F_1(P_1) = 0. \tag{B.9}$$

With the boundary condition $F_1(0) = 0$, we obtain the value function $F_1(P_1) = D_1 P_1^{\beta_{11}}$ where β_{11} is the positive solution to the characteristic equation

$$\frac{1}{2}\sigma^2 \beta_1(\beta_1 - 1) + \alpha_1 \beta_1 - \rho = 0. \tag{B.10}$$

Similar to Section Appendix B.1, the option value should satisfy the value-matching and smooth-pasting boundary conditions at the investment threshold P_1^*. However, we must check for both cases of $P_1^* < P_2^*$ and $P_1^* \geq P_2^*$, as the value of P_1^* determines if we enter the continuation region or stopping region of $F_2(P)$ in Eq. (B.7).

If $\mathbf{P_1^* < P_2^*}$. the boundary conditions become

$$\begin{aligned} D_1 P_1^{*\beta_{11}} &= D_2 P_1^{*\beta_{12}} - I_1, \\ \beta_{11} D_1 P_1^{*\beta_{11}-1} &= \beta_{12} D_2 P_1^{*\beta_{12}-1}, \end{aligned} \tag{B.11}$$

where D_2 is given by Eq. (B.6). This gives the solutions of D_1 and P_1^*,

$$D_1 = \frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{11}} D_2 \left[\frac{I_1}{(1 - \frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{11}})D_2}\right]^{1-\frac{\beta_{11}}{\beta_{12}}}, \tag{B.12}$$

$$P_1^* = \left[\frac{I_1}{(1 - \frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{11}})D_2}\right]^{\frac{1}{\beta_{12}}}, \tag{B.13}$$

and we have the value of the firm given by

$$F_1(P_1) = \begin{cases} D_1 P_1^{\beta_{11}} & \text{if } P_1 < P_1^*, \\ D_2 P_1^{\beta_{12}} - I_1 & \text{if } P_1 \geq P_1^*. \end{cases} \tag{B.14}$$

If $\mathbf{P_1^*} \geq \mathbf{P_2^*}$. the boundary conditions become

$$\begin{aligned} D_1 P_1^{*\beta_{11}} &= \frac{P_1^*}{\rho - \alpha_2} - I_2 - I_1, \\ \beta_{11} D_1 P_1^{*\beta_{11}-1} &= \frac{1}{\rho - \alpha_2}, \end{aligned} \tag{B.15}$$

which gives the expressions for D_1 and P_1^*

$$P_1^* = \frac{\beta_{11}}{\beta_{11} - 1} (\rho - \alpha_2) (I_1 + I_2), \tag{B.16}$$

$$D_1 = \frac{1}{(\rho - \alpha_2)\beta_{11}} \left[\frac{\beta_{11}}{\beta_{11} - 1} (\rho - \alpha_2) (I_1 + I_2) \right]^{1-\beta_{11}}, \tag{B.17}$$

and the value of the firm becomes

$$F_1(P_1) = \begin{cases} D_1 P_1^{\beta_{11}} & \text{if } P_1 < P_1^*, \\ V(P_1) - I_1 - I_2 & \text{if } P_1 \geq P_1^*, \end{cases} \tag{B.18}$$

where $V(P_1)$ is given in Eq. (A.5). □

Appendix B.3. Proof of Corollary 2.3

Taking the inequality $P_1^* \geq P_2^*$, with P_1^* and P_2^* being given by Eq. (14) and Eq. (7), respectively. Reordering the terms give that $P_1^* \geq P_2^*$ if the following inequality holds

$$I_1 \geq \frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{12} - 1} \left(\frac{1}{\beta_{12}} - \frac{1}{\beta_{11}} \right) \times I_2, \tag{B.19}$$

where the right-hand side is positive, since $1 < \beta_{12} < \beta_{11}$ if $\alpha_2 > \alpha_1$ from Corollary 2.4. Now evaluating the inequality $P_1^* < P_2^*$, where P_1^* is given by Eq. (14) and P_2^* by Eq. (7). Then the inequality becomes

$$\left[\frac{I_1}{\left(1 - \frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{11}} D_2\right)} \right]^{\frac{1}{\beta_{12}}} < \frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{12} - 1} (\rho - \alpha_2) I_2, \tag{B.20}$$

where D_2 is given in Proposition 2.1. Inserting the expression for D_2, we obtain by direct rearrangement that $P_1^* < P_2^*$ yields the inequality

$$I_1 < \frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{12} - 1} \left(\frac{1}{\beta_{12}} - \frac{1}{\beta_{11}} \right) \times I_2. \tag{B.21}$$

Thus, the ordering of the thresholds is unique, and whether the inequality in Eq. (B.21) holds determines if $P_1^* < P_2^*$. □

Appendix B.4. Proof of Corollary 2.4

Appendix B.4.1. Part i)

Define the characteristic equation as $\mathbb{Q}(x, \rho, \sigma, \alpha) = \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2 x(x-1) + \alpha x - \rho = 0$, and let β_{12} and β_{11} represent the positive roots of the characteristic equations $\mathbb{Q}(\beta_2, \rho, \sigma, \alpha_2)$ and $\mathbb{Q}(\beta_1, \rho, \sigma, \alpha_1)$, respectively. Then $\beta_{12} < \beta_{11}$ gives

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{1}{2} - \frac{\alpha_2}{\sigma^2} + \sqrt{\left(\frac{\alpha_2}{\sigma^2} - \frac{1}{2}\right)^2 + \frac{2\rho}{\sigma^2}} &< \frac{1}{2} - \frac{\alpha_1}{\sigma^2} + \sqrt{\left(\frac{\alpha_1}{\sigma^2} - \frac{1}{2}\right)^2 + \frac{2\rho}{\sigma^2}} \\ \Rightarrow \alpha_2 - \alpha_1 > \sigma^2 &\left(\sqrt{\left(\frac{\alpha_2}{\sigma^2} - \frac{1}{2}\right)^2 + \frac{2\rho}{\sigma^2}} - \sqrt{\left(\frac{\alpha_1}{\sigma^2} - \frac{1}{2}\right)^2 + \frac{2\rho}{\sigma^2}}\right) \end{aligned}$$

If we assume that $\alpha_2 - \alpha_1 > 0$, then we obtain that

$$\sqrt{\left(\frac{\alpha_2}{\sigma^2} - \frac{1}{2}\right)^2 + \frac{2\rho}{\sigma^2}} - \sqrt{\left(\frac{\alpha_1}{\sigma^2} - \frac{1}{2}\right)^2 + \frac{2\rho}{\sigma^2}} > 0,$$

and since this inequality holds, we know that $\alpha_2 > \alpha_2$ implies that $\beta_{12} < \beta_{11}$.

Appendix B.4.2. Part ii)

If the drift rate is constant for the two price processes $P_1(t)$ and $P_2(t)$, i.e. $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2$, then $\beta_{12} = \beta_{11}$. From this, the value-matching and smooth-pasting boundary conditions when $P_1^* < P_2^*$, given by Eq. (B.11), are contradictory. Thus, $P_1^* \geq P_2^*$ always holds when $\alpha_1 = \alpha_2$. □

Appendix B.5. Proof of Proposition 2.5

To prove Proposition 2.5–2.7, we first present an auxiliary result outlining the sign of the partial derivatives of β_{12} and β_{11}, where β_{12} and β_{11} denote the positive roots of the quadratic equations in Eq. (B.3) and Eq. (B.10), respectively. We know that $\beta_{12}, \beta_{11} > 1$ (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994).

Lemma Appendix B.1. *The sign of the partial derivatives of β_{12} are given as*

$$\frac{\partial \beta_{12}}{\partial \sigma} < 0, \qquad \frac{\partial \beta_{12}}{\partial \alpha_2} < 0. \tag{B.22}$$

From this, the sign of the partial derivatives of the fraction $\frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{12}-1}$ are given as

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial \sigma}\frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{12}-1} > 0, \qquad \frac{\partial}{\partial \alpha_2}\frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{12}-1} > 0. \tag{B.23}$$

The same holds for the partial derivatives of β_{11} and the fraction $\frac{\beta_{11}}{\beta_{11}-1}$ w.r.t. σ and α_1.

Proof of Lemma Appendix B.1. Evaluate the total derivative of the quadratic equation, $\mathbb{Q}$, in Eq. (B.3) w.r.t. σ and α_2 at the positive root β_{12}:

$$\frac{\partial \mathbb{Q}}{\partial \beta_{12}} \frac{\partial \beta_{12}}{\partial \sigma} + \frac{\partial \mathbb{Q}}{\partial \sigma} = 0, \qquad \frac{\partial \mathbb{Q}}{\partial \beta_{12}} \frac{\partial \beta_{12}}{\partial \alpha_2} + \frac{\partial \mathbb{Q}}{\partial \alpha_2} = 0. \tag{B.24}$$

Thus we have that the partial derivatives given by

$$\frac{\partial \beta_{12}}{\partial \sigma} = -\frac{\partial \mathbb{Q}/\partial \sigma}{\partial \mathbb{Q}/\partial \beta_{12}}, \qquad \frac{\partial \beta_{12}}{\partial \alpha_2} = -\frac{\partial \mathbb{Q}/\partial \alpha_2}{\partial \mathbb{Q}/\partial \beta_{12}}. \tag{B.25}$$

The partial derivative of the quadratic w.r.t. β_{12} is given as $\partial \mathbb{Q}/\partial \beta_{12} = \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2(2\beta_{12} - 1) + \alpha_2$. Since we know $\beta_{12} > 1$, and $\sigma,\ \alpha_2 > 0$, we have $\partial \mathbb{Q}/\partial \beta_{12} > 0$. Further we have the partial derivatives

$$\frac{\partial \mathbb{Q}}{\partial \sigma} = \sigma\beta_{12}(\beta_{12} - 1) > 0, \qquad \frac{\partial \mathbb{Q}}{\partial \alpha_2} = \beta_{12} > 0. \tag{B.26}$$

From this we have that Eq. (B.24) holds. Further, have the derivative of the fraction given as

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial \beta_{12}} \frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{12} - 1} = \frac{-1}{(\beta_{12} - 1)^2} < 0 \tag{B.27}$$

and the related derivatives of the fraction in Eq. (B.23) are true. The same can be shown for β_{11}. □

From Proposition 2.1 we have that the second investment threshold given by

$$P_2(\tau_2) = P_2^* = \frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{12} - 1}(\rho - \alpha_2)I_2. \tag{B.28}$$

Trivially, we see that P_2^* is unaffected by α_1 and I_1, as well as increasing in I_2. Using Lemma Appendix B.1 and noting that $\beta_{12} > 1$, the partial derivative of P_2^* w.r.t. σ give

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial \sigma} P_2^* = (\rho - \alpha_2)I_2 \frac{\partial}{\partial \sigma} \frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{12} - 1} \quad > 0 \tag{B.29}$$

with the assumption that $\rho > \alpha_2$. For the first investment threshold, it is given by Proposition 2.2 as

$$P_1^* = \begin{cases} \frac{\beta_{11}}{\beta_{11}-1}(\rho - \alpha_2)(I_1 + I_2) & \text{if } P_1^* \geq P_2^* \\ \left[\frac{I_1}{\left(1 - \frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{11}}\right) D_2} \right]^{\frac{1}{\beta_{12}}} & \text{if } P_1^* < P_2^* \end{cases} \tag{B.30}$$

where D_2 is given in Proposition 2.1. For the case when $P_1^* \geq P_2^*$, using Lemma Appendix B.1, the sign of the partial derivative w.r.t. σ is given by

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial \sigma} P_1^* = (\rho - \alpha_2)(I_1 + I_2) \frac{\partial}{\partial \sigma} \frac{\beta_{11}}{\beta_{11} - 1} > 0 \tag{B.31}$$

For the case when $P_1^* < P_2^*$, the partial derivative w.r.t. σ becomes

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial}{\partial\sigma}P_1^* = &\underbrace{\left[\frac{I_1}{(1-\frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{11}})D_2}\right]^{\frac{1}{\beta_{12}}}}_{>0}\left(\frac{1}{\beta_{12}}\left(\frac{I_1}{(1-\frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{11}})D_2}\right)^{-1}\frac{\partial}{\partial\sigma}\frac{I_1}{(1-\frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{11}})D_2}\right.\\ &\left.+\ln\left[\frac{I_1}{(1-\frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{11}})D_2}\right]\frac{\partial}{\partial\sigma}\frac{1}{\beta_{12}}\right).\end{aligned} \tag{B.32}$$

Using the partial derivatives of D_2, and $\frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{11}}$ as given by

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial\sigma}P_2^* = (\rho-\alpha_2)I_2\frac{\sigma\beta_{12}(\beta_{12}-1)}{0.5\sigma^2(2\beta_{12}-1)+\alpha_2}\frac{1}{(\beta_{12}-1)^2} \tag{B.33}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{\partial}{\partial\sigma}D_2 &= \frac{(P_2^*)^{-\beta_{12}}}{(\rho-\alpha_2)\beta_{12}^2}\left[-P_2^*\left(\frac{\partial}{\partial\sigma}\beta_{12}\right)(\beta_{12}\ln(P_2^*)+1)-(\beta_{12}-1)\beta_{12}\left(\frac{\partial}{\partial\sigma}P_2^*\right)\right]\\ &= \frac{(P_2^*)^{-\beta_{12}}}{(\rho-\alpha_2)\beta_{12}^2}\times\frac{\sigma\beta_{12}(\beta_{12}-1)}{0.5\sigma^2(2\beta_{12}-1)+\alpha_2}\times P_2^*\times\beta_{12}\ln(P_2^*)\end{aligned} \tag{B.34}$$

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial\sigma}\frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{11}} = \frac{1}{\beta_{11}^2}\left[\beta_{12}\frac{\sigma\beta_{11}(\beta_{11}-1)}{0.5\sigma^2(2\beta_{11}-1)+\alpha_1}-\beta_{11}\frac{\sigma\beta_{12}(\beta_{12}-1)}{0.5\sigma^2(2\beta_{12}-1)+\alpha_2}\right] \tag{B.35}$$

we obtain that

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial\sigma}P_1^* = \frac{P_1^*}{\beta_1(\beta_{11}-\beta_{12})}\left[(1+(\beta_{11}-\beta_{12})\ln\left(\frac{P_2^*}{P_1^*}\right)\frac{d}{d\sigma}\beta_{12}-\frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{11}}\frac{d}{d\sigma}\beta_{11}\right]. \tag{B.36}$$

Thus, $\frac{\partial P_1^*}{\partial\sigma} > 0$ implies that the following inequality must hold:

$$(1+(\beta_{11}-\beta_{12})\ln(\frac{P_2^*}{P_1^*})\frac{d}{d\sigma}\beta_{12}-\frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{11}}\frac{d}{d\sigma}\beta_{11} > 0.$$

Rearranging, and using the fact that

$$\ln\left(\frac{P_2^*}{P_1^*}\right) = \ln\left(\frac{(\beta_{11}-\beta_{12})I_2}{\beta_{11}(\beta_{12}-1)I_1}\right)^{\frac{1}{\beta_{12}}},$$

we obtain that $\frac{d}{d\sigma}P_1^* > 0$ if the following condition holds

$$I_2 < \frac{\beta_{11}(\beta_{12}-1)}{\beta_{11}-\beta_{12}}\times\exp\left\{\frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{11}-\beta_{12}}\left(\frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{11}}\frac{d\beta_{11}/d\sigma}{d\beta_{12}/d\sigma}-1\right)\right\}\times I_1$$

Inserting the expressions for $\frac{d\beta_{11}/d\sigma}{d\beta_{12}/d\sigma}$ from Lemma B.24, we obtain the stated condition. $\square$

Appendix B.6. Proof of Proposition 2.6

The second investment threshold, P_2^*, is given in Proposition 2.1, while the first threshold is given by Proposition 2.2. For the sensitivity to the initial drift rate, α_1, the partial derivative of the second investment threshold is trivially zero, as all terms are independent of α_1.
For the case when $P_1^* \geq P_2^*$, the sign of the partial derivative of P_1^* w.r.t. α_1 is given by

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial \alpha_1} P_1^* = (\rho - \alpha_2)(I_1 + I_2) \frac{\partial}{\partial \alpha_1} \frac{\beta_{11}}{\beta_{11} - 1} > 0, \tag{B.37}$$

where the sign is given by Lemma Appendix B.1 and the assumptions that $\rho > \alpha_2$, $I_1, I_2 > 0$.
For the case when $P_1^* < P_2^*$, we have that

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial}{\partial \alpha_1} P_1^* &= \left[\frac{I_1}{D_2}\right]^{\frac{1}{\beta_{12}}} \frac{\partial}{\partial \alpha_1} \left[\frac{1}{1 - \frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{11}}}\right]^{\frac{1}{\beta_{12}}} \\ &= \left[\frac{I_1}{D_2}\right]^{\frac{1}{\beta_{12}}} \frac{1}{\beta_{12}} \left[\frac{1}{1 - \frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{11}}}\right]^{\frac{1}{\beta_{12}} - 1} \frac{\partial}{\partial \alpha_1} \frac{1}{1 - \frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{11}}}. \end{aligned} \tag{B.38}$$

Since we know that $\beta_{12} < \beta_{11}$ from Corollary 2.4, and that $D_2 > 0$, and assume that $I_1 > 0$, the sign of the derivative is dependent on the last term. Using the fact that

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial \alpha_1} \left(1 - \frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{11}}\right)^{-1} = \frac{-\beta_{12}}{\beta_{11}^2 \left(1 - \frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{11}}\right)^2} \frac{\partial}{\partial \alpha_1} \beta_{11}, \tag{B.39}$$

we know that $\frac{\partial P_1^*}{\partial \alpha_1} > 0$, since Lemma Appendix B.1 states that $\frac{\partial \beta_{11}}{\partial \alpha_1} < 0$. □

Appendix B.7. Proof of Proposition 2.7

The expressions for the second investment threshold, P_2^*, and the first threshold, P_1^*, are given by Proposition 2.1 and Proposition 2.2, respectively. The sensitivity to the boosted drift rate, α_2, is then given for P_2^* as

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial \alpha_2} P_2^* = I_2 \frac{\partial}{\partial \alpha_2} (\rho - \alpha_2) \frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{12} - 1} = I_2 \left[\frac{-\beta_{12}}{\beta_{12} - 1} + (\rho - \alpha_2) \frac{\partial}{\partial \alpha_2} \frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{12} - 1}\right]. \tag{B.40}$$

From Lemma Appendix B.1, we have that the last term in the bracket is positive, meaning that the overall effect is ambiguous. The last term is given as

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial \alpha_2} \frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{12} - 1} = \frac{-\partial \beta_{12} / \partial \alpha_2}{(\beta_{12} - 1)^2} = \frac{\beta_{12}}{\frac{1}{2}\sigma^2 (2\beta_{12} - 1) + \alpha_2} \frac{1}{(\beta_{12} - 1)^2} \tag{B.41}$$

Thus, the derivative of the threshold becomes

$$\frac{1}{I_2}\frac{\partial}{\partial \alpha_2}P_2^* = \left[-1 + (\rho - \alpha_2)\frac{1}{\frac{1}{2}\sigma^2(2\beta_{12} - 1) + \alpha_2}\frac{1}{\beta_{12} - 1}\right]\frac{\beta_{12}}{\beta_{12} - 1}. \tag{B.42}$$

Noting that the last term is always positive, the sign of the derivative is dependent on the term in the brackets. Finding the negative region as

$$-1 + (\rho - \alpha_2)\frac{1}{\frac{1}{2}\sigma^2(2\beta_{12} - 1) + \alpha_2}\frac{1}{\beta_{12} - 1} < 0, \tag{B.43}$$

which implies

$$\sigma^2 > \frac{\rho - \alpha_1\beta_{12}}{(\beta_{12} - 1)(\beta_{12} - \frac{1}{2})}. \tag{B.44}$$

Thus, $\partial P_2^*/\partial \alpha_2$ is negative as long as Eq (B.44) holds. □

Appendix B.8. Proof of Proposition 3.1

The firm maximizes the expected net present value function at the time of investment, given by

$$V(P_2, K) - I - \xi K = \frac{P_2}{\rho - \alpha_2(K)} - I - \xi K, \tag{B.45}$$

where $\alpha_2(K)$ is given by Eq. (19). The first- and second-order derivatives of this value function are given by

$$\frac{\partial}{\partial K}\left[V(P_2, K) - \xi K\right] = \frac{P_2 \frac{\partial}{\partial K}\alpha_2(K)}{(\rho - \alpha_2(K))^2} - \xi, \tag{B.46}$$

and

$$\frac{\partial^2}{\partial K^2}\left[V(P_2, K) - \xi K\right] = \frac{P_2\left[(\rho - \alpha_2(K))\frac{\partial^2}{\partial K^2}\alpha_2(K) + 2\left(\frac{\partial}{\partial K}\alpha_2(K)\right)^2\right]}{(\rho - \alpha_2(K))^3}. \tag{B.47}$$

Setting the first-order derivative to zero, and rearranging, give the positive solution

$$\hat{K}^*(P_2) = \frac{\xi(\alpha_1 - \rho) + \sqrt{P_2\xi(\rho - \epsilon - \alpha_1)}}{\xi\epsilon}, \tag{B.48}$$

and $K^*(P_2^*) = \max\{0, \hat{K}^*(P_2)\}$. Further the second-order derivative is given by

$$\frac{\partial^2}{\partial K^2}V(P_2, K) - \xi K = \frac{-2\epsilon(\rho - \epsilon - \alpha_1)}{(K\epsilon + \rho - \alpha_1)^3}P_2. \tag{B.49}$$

This is always negative, as we assume that $\rho - \epsilon - \alpha_1 > 0$, and K is bounded by below by zero. The price process $P_2(t)$ is following a geometric Brownian Motion, so it will never be negative. Hence, $K^*(P_2)$ is the global maximum. The resulting optimal drift rate $\alpha_2^*(P_2)$ is given by

$$\begin{aligned}\alpha_2^*(P_2) = \alpha_2^*(K^*(P_2)) &= \rho - \epsilon - \frac{\rho - \epsilon - \alpha_1}{1 + K^*(P_2)} \\ &= \rho - \epsilon - \frac{\xi\epsilon(\rho - \epsilon - \alpha_1)}{\xi(-\rho + \epsilon + \alpha_1) + \sqrt{P_2\xi(\rho - \epsilon - \alpha_1)}} \\ &= \frac{(\epsilon - \rho)\sqrt{P_2\xi(\rho - \epsilon - \alpha_1)} + \rho\xi(\rho - \epsilon - \alpha_1)}{\xi(\rho - \epsilon - \alpha_1) - \sqrt{P_2\xi(\rho - \epsilon - \alpha_1)}}\end{aligned} \tag{B.50}$$

□

Appendix B.9. Proof of Corollary 3.2

Using the equation for $\hat{K}^*(P_2)$ in Proposition 3.1, and finding the inequality $\hat{K}^*(P_2) > 0$, we obtain

$$\frac{\xi(\alpha_1 - \rho) + \sqrt{P_2\xi(\rho - \epsilon - \alpha_1)}}{\xi\epsilon} > 0, \tag{B.51}$$

which after rearranging yields the inequality

$$P_2 > \frac{\xi(\rho - \alpha_1)^2}{\rho - \epsilon - \alpha_1}, \tag{B.52}$$

where we have used the assumptions that $\rho - \epsilon - \alpha_1 > 0$, $\epsilon > 0$, and $\xi > 0$. □

Appendix B.10. Proof of Proposition 3.3

Before investment, the value of the opportunity to invest follows from a Bellman equation similar to Proposition 2.2. Solving the resulting ordinary differential equation, and letting β_{11} be the positive solution to the quadratic equation $\mathbb{Q} = \frac{1}{2}\sigma^2\beta_1(\beta_1 - 1) + \alpha_1\beta_1 - \rho = 0$, the value of the firm is then given as in Eq. (26). The the value-matching and smooth-pasting boundary conditions at the investment threshold P_1^* are given by,

$$\begin{aligned} AP_1^{*\beta_{11}} &= \frac{P_1^*}{\rho - \alpha_2^*(P_1^*)} - I - \xi K^*(P_1^*) \\ \beta_{11}AP_1^{*\beta_{11}-1} &= \frac{d}{dP_1}\left[\frac{P_1}{\rho - \alpha_2(K_1^*(P_1))} - I - \xi K^*(P_1)\right]_{P_1 = P_1^*}. \end{aligned} \tag{B.53}$$

Defining the term in brackets as $f(P_1, K(P_1))$, we obtain that the total derivative is given as

$$AP_1^{*\beta_{11}}\frac{\beta_{11}}{P_1^*} = \frac{\partial}{\partial P_1}f(P_1, K(P_1)) + \frac{\partial f(P_1, K(P_1))}{\partial K}\frac{\partial K(P_1)}{\partial P_1} \tag{B.54}$$

However, by the construction of the first-order maximization of K, we have that $\partial f(\cdot)/\partial K = 0$, and we obtain

$$AP_1^{*\beta_{11}} = \frac{P_1^*}{\beta_{11}} \frac{1}{\rho - \alpha_2(K_1^*(P_1^*))} \tag{B.55}$$

Subtracting the equations from the conditions of continuity and smoothness, we obtain

$$\frac{\beta_{11}-1}{\beta_{11}} \frac{P_1^*}{\rho - \alpha_2(K^*(P_1^*))} - I - \xi K^*(P_1^*) = 0. \tag{B.56}$$

Using the equations for $K_1^*(P_1)$ and $\alpha_2^*(P_1)$, this becomes the second-order polynomial for $\sqrt{P_1^*}$ given by

$$P_1^* - \left(\frac{\beta_{11}}{\beta_{11}-1} + 1\right) \sqrt{\xi(\rho - \epsilon - \alpha_1)} \sqrt{P_1^*} + \frac{\beta_{11}}{\beta_{11}-1} (\xi(\rho - \alpha_1) - I\epsilon) = 0. \tag{B.57}$$

Solving for $\sqrt{P_1^*}$, we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \sqrt{P_1^*} &= \frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{\beta_{11}}{\beta_{11}-1} + 1\right) \sqrt{\xi(\rho - \epsilon - \alpha_1)} \\ &\pm \sqrt{\frac{1}{4}\left(\frac{\beta_{11}}{\beta_{11}-1} + 1\right)^2 \xi(\rho - \epsilon - \alpha_1) + \frac{\beta_{11}}{\beta_{11}-1}(I\epsilon - \xi(\rho - \alpha_1))}. \end{aligned} \tag{B.58}$$

Squaring this and rearranging, we obtain the solution for P_1^*, as given by

$$\begin{aligned} P_1^* &= \frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{2\beta_{11}-1}{\beta_{11}-1}\right)^2 \xi(\rho - \epsilon - \alpha_1) + \frac{\beta_{11}}{\beta_{11}-1}(I\epsilon - \xi(\rho - \alpha_1)) \\ &\pm \frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{2\beta_{11}-1}{\beta_{11}-1}\right) \sqrt{\xi(\rho - \epsilon - \alpha_1)\left(\frac{\beta_{11}}{\beta_{11}-1}(I\epsilon - \xi(\rho - \alpha_1) + \xi(\rho - \epsilon - \alpha_1))\right)}. \end{aligned} \tag{B.59}$$

Taking the minus part of Eq. (B.58), we derive when this is smaller than zero. This yields a non-admissible solution, as the square root of the threshold cannot be negative. Setting $\sqrt{P_1^*} < 0$, we obtain

$$\frac{\beta_{11}}{\beta_{11}-1}(I\epsilon - \xi(\rho - \alpha_1)) > 0. \tag{B.60}$$

We know the fraction is greater than zero, since $\beta_{11} > 1$. Thus, there is only one non-negative root for the investment threshold, i.e. $\sqrt{P_1^*} > 0$, if the following condition holds

$$I\epsilon > \xi(\rho - \alpha_1). \tag{B.61}$$

□

Appendix B.11. Proof of Corollary 3.4

For Eq. (B.59) to have real-valued solutions, the term in the square root must be greater than or equal to zero. When rearranging this term, we obtain the condition

$$I\epsilon \geq \xi(\rho - \alpha_1) - \xi(\rho - \epsilon - \alpha_1)\frac{\beta_{11} - 1}{\beta_{11}}. \tag{B.62}$$

□

Appendix B.12. Proof of Proposition 3.5

As seen in Section Appendix B.1, the value of the second-stage option is dependent on the value of the drift, and therefore becomes a function of the control K in the controlled case. However, the choice of K is undertaken before the second-stage option exists, and K can therefore be considered a constant in this region. Thus, the proof follows analogously the proof in Section Appendix B.1, with the terms being functions of K through the dependence of $\alpha_2(K)$ on K. □

Appendix B.13. Proof of Proposition 3.6

For the case with controlled change in drift, the value of the option to invest in the first-stage is, similarly to the fixed case presented in Proposition 2.2, dependent on the ordering of the threshold. The value of the option to invest in the first stage, $F_1(P_1)$, for a given price P_1, is given by the Bellman equation in Appendix Appendix B.2. The value function is therefore given as $F_1(P_1) = D_1 P_1^{\beta_{11}}$, where D_1 is a parameter to be decided and β_{11} the positive solution to the fundamental equation in Eq. (B.10). At the investment threshold, the firm must chose optimal value of K, and pay the investment cost. The value-matching and boundary conditions is dependent on the ordering of the thresholds.

If $\mathbf{P_1^* \geq P_2^*}$. the value of the option to invest is given by

$$F(P_1) = \begin{cases} D_1 P_1^{\beta_{11}} & \text{if } P_1 < P_1^* \\ \max_K \left\{ \frac{P_1}{\rho - \alpha_2(K)} - I_1 - I_2 - \xi K \right\} & \text{if } P_1 \geq P_1^* \end{cases} \tag{B.63}$$

This is the same situation as in Proposition 3.3, with $I = I_1 + I_2$, proven in Appendix Appendix B.10

If $\mathbf{P_1^* < P_2^*}$. the value of the option to invest is given by

$$F(P_1) = \begin{cases} D_1 P_1^{\beta_{11}} & \text{if } P_1 < P_1^* \\ \max_K \left\{ D_2(K) P_1^{\beta_{12}(K)} - I_1 - \xi K \right\} & \text{if } P_1 \geq P_1^* \end{cases} \tag{B.64}$$

where $D_2(K)$ is given by Eq. 6. Defining K^* as the maximizing argument, the value-matching and smooth-pasting boundary conditions at the threshold becomes

$$\begin{aligned} D_1 P_1^{*\beta_{11}} &= D_2(K^*) P_1^{*\beta_{12}(K^*)} - I_1 - \xi K^*, \\ \beta_{11} D_1 P_1^{*\beta_{11}-1} &= \beta_{12}(K^*) D_2(K^*) P_1^{*\beta_{12}(K^*)-1}, \end{aligned} \tag{B.65}$$

Multiplying the second equation by $\frac{P_1^*}{\beta_{11}}$, and subtracting the left- and right-hand-sides of the equations yields that P_1^* must satisfy the equation given by

$$(\beta_{12}(K^*) - \beta_{11})D_2(K^*)P_1^{*\beta_{12}(K^*)} + (I_1 + \xi K^*)\beta_{11} = 0. \tag{B.66}$$

□

Appendix B.14. Proof of Proposition 3.7

Taking the value of the first investment threshold, P_1^*, given by Eq. (B.59), we compute the derivative $\frac{dP_1^*}{d\sigma}$. We obtain that

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{dP_1^*}{d\sigma} &= \frac{1}{2}\xi(\rho-\epsilon-\alpha_1)\frac{d}{d\sigma}\left(\frac{2\beta_{11}-1}{\beta_{11}-1}\right)^2 + (I\epsilon - \xi(\rho-\alpha_1))\frac{d}{d\sigma}\frac{\beta_{11}}{\beta_{11}-1} \\ &+ \frac{d}{d\sigma}\left[\frac{1}{2}\frac{2\beta_{11}-1}{\beta_{11}-1}\sqrt{\xi(\rho-\epsilon-\alpha_1)(\xi(\rho-\epsilon-\alpha_1)+\frac{\beta_{11}}{\beta_{11}-1}(I\epsilon-\xi(\rho-\alpha_1)))}\right]\end{aligned} \tag{B.67}$$

The sign of the first term is given as

$$\frac{d}{d\sigma}\left(\frac{2\beta_{11}-1}{\beta_{11}-1}\right)^2 = \frac{4\beta_{11}-2}{\beta_{11}-1} \times \frac{-d\beta_{11}/d\sigma}{(\beta_{11}-1)^2} > 0. \tag{B.68}$$

This is larger than zero, since we know from Lemma Appendix B.1 that $d\beta_{11}/d\sigma < 0$. The sign of the second term in Eq. (B.67) is given by $\frac{d}{d\sigma}\frac{\beta_{11}}{\beta_{11}-1}$, which we know from Lemma Appendix B.1 is larger than zero. The sign of the last term in Eq. (B.67) is given by

$$\frac{d}{d\sigma}[\cdots] = \sqrt{\cdots} \times \frac{d}{d\sigma}\left[\frac{1}{2}\frac{2\beta_{11}-1}{\beta_{11}-1}\right] + \frac{1}{2}\frac{2\beta_{11}-1}{\beta_{11}-1} \times \frac{d}{d\sigma}\sqrt{\cdots}. \tag{B.69}$$

In this equation, we know from earlier that the first term is positive, as long as the square-root is well-defined. For the second term, the sign is determined by the derivative of the square-root, which is given by

$$\frac{d}{d\sigma}\sqrt{\cdots} = \frac{1}{2\sqrt{\cdots}} \times (I\epsilon - \xi(\rho-\alpha_1)) \times \frac{d}{d\sigma}\frac{\beta_{11}}{\beta_{11}-1}. \tag{B.70}$$

We know that $\frac{d}{d\sigma}\frac{\beta_{11}}{\beta_{11}-1} > 0$. Therefore, if $I\epsilon - \xi(\rho-\alpha_1) > 0$, the overall term is positive. This is exactly the necessary condition for a unique threshold, given in Section Appendix B.10. Since all the evaluated derivatives are postive, we know that $dP_1^*/d\sigma > 0$. □

Appendix B.15. Proof of Proposition 4.1

This result is similar to the case proved in Section Appendix B.10, with a different impulse function. However, now the maximization does not yield an analytical result for K^*. Thus, the value of the optimal control is given implicitly as the maximizing argument. Further, using conditions of continuity and smoothness of the value function at the investment threshold, similar to Section (Appendix B.2), it is straightforward to see that the investment threshold, P_1^*, must satisfy the expression given in Eq. (49). $\square$

Appendix B.16. Proof of Proposition 4.2

This result follows the case proved in Section Appendix B.10, with the investment cost for the first project stage given as $I_K(K) = I_1 + \xi K^\eta$. The value of the optimal control is given implicitly as the maximizing argument for each case of the ordering of the thresholds P_1^* and P_2^*. Further, using conditions of continuity and smoothness of the value function at the investment threshold, similar to Section (Appendix B.2), P_1^*, must satisfy the expression given in Eq. (56). $\square$